Edvon v. Morales, 2018 Ohio 5171

Background

In August 2014 neighbor Richard Edvon confronted a hallway altercation and, believing a teenage girl was being assaulted, opened his apartment door and pointed a loaded handgun at Alejandro Morales; Edvon had a concealed-carry permit.
The Morales family told responding Parma Heights officers they wished to prosecute because Edvon pointed the gun at them; officers learned Edvon admitted pointing the gun and that his two small children were inside the apartment.
Officers arrested Edvon for aggravated menacing (Alejandro signed the complaint) and later charged him with child endangering after conferring with a supervisor; all charges were dismissed without prejudice in June 2015.
Edvon sued for malicious prosecution against the officers (and other claims against the Moraleses); the trial court granted summary judgment for the officers in their official capacities but denied summary judgment as to their individual-capacity immunity.
On appeal the Eighth District reversed, holding officers had probable cause to charge Edvon for both aggravated menacing and child endangering and thus were entitled to individual immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Edvon)	Defendant's Argument (Officers)	Held
Whether officers lacked individual immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) for malicious prosecution	Officers acted with malice/bad faith/wanton recklessness in charging Edvon; genuine factual disputes (e.g., refusal to hear his side, affirmative defense of defense-of-others, facts about children’s whereabouts) preclude immunity	Officers had statutory immunity because they had probable cause to arrest and charge Edvon for aggravated menacing and child endangering based on victims’ statements and Edvon’s admission	Reversed trial court: officers entitled to individual immunity; summary judgment for officers should be entered and malicious-prosecution claim fails as a matter of law
Probable cause for aggravated menacing (R.C. 2903.21)	Edvon argues he was defending another (defense-of-others); officers should have examined his justification and factual record raises disputes about whether probable cause existed	Victim statements that Edvon knowingly pointed a gun at them, plus Edvon’s admission, supplied probable cause to charge aggravated menacing; officers were not required to accept or resolve an asserted affirmative defense pre-arrest	Held: probable cause existed because victims said they believed Edvon would cause serious harm and Edvon admitted pointing the gun; affirmative defenses do not automatically negate probable cause
Probable cause for child endangering (R.C. 2919.22)	Edvon says children were secured in a back room and not endangered; officers charged him in retaliation for denying them entry	Officers had reasonable grounds to believe Edvon recklessly created a substantial risk to his children by introducing a firearm into an unknown hallway confrontation and acknowledging the children were inside	Held: probable cause existed given Edvon’s admission and officers’ observations; the charge was supported by facts known to officers at the time
Whether summary judgment was appropriate where factual disputes and credibility issues exist	(Edvon) Credibility conflicts about material facts (where children were, why officers charged him, whether officers refused to hear his account) require denial of summary judgment	(Officers) Evidence (victim statements, Edvon’s admission, investigation) removed factual dispute on probable cause and immunity is appropriate as a matter of law	Held: appellate majority concluded no genuine issue as to probable cause and reversed; dissent argued majority impermissibly weighed credibility and would have upheld denial of summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (standard for appellate de novo review of summary judgment)
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (burden-shifting framework for summary judgment)
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367 (Ohio 1998) (summary judgment standard)
Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142 (Ohio 1990) (elements of malicious prosecution)
Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. 153 (Ohio 1921) (lack of probable cause as gist of malicious-prosecution action)
State v. Wac, 68 Ohio St.2d 84 (Ohio 1981) (probable cause judged by facts known at the time, not by hindsight)
Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 1999) (officers need not conduct pre-arrest quasi-trials to evaluate asserted legal excuses)
Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirmative defenses do not automatically vitiate probable cause)
Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 1999) (where officers had information that conclusively established a lawful basis for carrying weapons, probable cause was lacking)
Huber v. O’Neill, 66 Ohio St.2d 28 (Ohio 1981) (distinction between probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt)