Eduardo Enriquez v. William Barr, 969 F.3d 1057

Enriquez, a Mexican national, entered without inspection in 1997 as a child.
In 2000 his mother’s VAWA I-360 self-petition (listing him as a derivative) was approved; he received deferred action and later work authorization.
Enriquez adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status in 2008.
He was convicted in 2012 of attempting to dissuade a witness; DHS charged removability for a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission.
He applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a); IJ denied, BIA affirmed holding he was not “admitted in any status” until 2008; Ninth Circuit denied review under controlling precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether approval of a VAWA I-360 and resulting deferred action/work authorization in 2000 constitutes being “admitted in any status” for § 1229b(a)(2) (so continuous residence accrues from 2000)	Approval + deferred action + work auth are functionally inspections/authorizations that start accrual of continuous residence	"Admitted" should be defined by INA § 1101(a)(13)(A) (lawful entry after inspection/authorization); VAWA approval and deferred action/work auth are not equivalent to inspection/entry	Court: Under Ninth Circuit precedent (Medina‑Nunez and its progeny), those benefits are not an “admission”; Enriquez was not admitted until his 2008 adjustment to LPR, so he cannot meet the 7‑year post‑admission requirement
Whether Ramirez v. Brown (TPS treated as admission for adjustment) supports counting non‑entry benefits as admission here	Enriquez: Ramirez shows statutory context can justify a broader definition of “admitted”	Government: Ramirez involved different statutory text (TPS explicitly ties to adjustment) and is distinguishable	Court: Ramirez is inapplicable; VAWA lacks the TPS‑style statutory language that justified a different construction, so Medina‑Nunez controls

Medina‑Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (deferred to BIA; acceptance into Family Unity Program is not an "admission" for § 1229b(a)(2))
Garcia‑Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (prior decision treating FUP as admission; later limited by Medina‑Nunez)
Fuentes v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2016) (derivative beneficiary with work authorization not an admission for cancellation purposes)
Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019) (parole/discretionary benefits not an admission for § 1229b(a)(2))
Vasquez de Alcantar v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (approval of family‑based petition (I‑130) is not itself an admission)
Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017) (TPS treated as admission for adjustment of status due to explicit statutory language—distinguished here)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (principle allowing deference to agency interpretations where applicable)