245 A.3d 927
Del.2021Background
- Plaintiffs are banana plantation workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama who sued U.S. companies for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to the pesticide DBCP.
- A large putative Texas class action (1993) and a Texas federal forum non conveniens dismissal (1995) with a return-clause produced a complex, multi‑forum procedural history; Texas state court denied class certification on June 3, 2010.
- In June 2012 plaintiffs filed multiple follow‑on suits, including a Delaware Superior Court action (Chaverri/Blanco) and companion suits in the District of Delaware (Chavez, Marquinez).
- Delaware Superior Court dismissed the Superior Court action in Nov. 2013 under the McWane forum‑non‑conveniens doctrine (relying on prior Louisiana litigation), and this Court affirmed.
- After intervening decisions (Third Circuit en banc in Chavez, Delaware Supreme Court in Marquinez, and Gramercy), plaintiffs moved in Dec. 2018 under Superior Court Civ. R. 60(b)(6) to vacate the 2013 dismissal as an "extraordinary" change in law producing disparate treatment; the Superior Court denied relief as untimely and not showing extraordinary circumstances.
- The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted because intervening decisions (Chavez, Marquinez, Gramercy) created extraordinary circumstances and disparate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs | Intervening federal and Delaware rulings changed the legal landscape so that federal‑court plaintiffs may proceed while Superior Court plaintiffs cannot; that disparity is extraordinary and justifies vacatur | Intervening federal decisions do not control Delaware state forum‑non‑conveniens doctrine; no extraordinary circumstances exist to reopen final judgment | Denied — Court held the federal and state doctrines differ, changes were not extraordinary in this context, and no abuse of discretion in refusing relief |
| Whether plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion was timely | Plaintiffs filed within months of the Third Circuit and other decisions and were diligent given the case complexity and need to retain counsel | Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed (seven months after key Third Circuit order; longer after Gramercy); delay is attributable to plaintiffs’ strategy and is unreasonable | Affirmed — Court agreed Superior Court validly found plaintiffs’ delay unreasonable as one factor in denying relief |
| Whether Chavez (Third Circuit en banc) and federal first‑filed rule require Delaware to stay/transfer rather than dismiss under McWane | Chavez shows federal first‑filed district courts should ordinarily stay/transfer and cautions against dismissal with prejudice; that reasoning should inform Delaware practice to avoid disparate outcomes | McWane is a distinct Delaware forum‑non‑conveniens doctrine with different rationales and remedial options; federal first‑filed rule does not control state McWane analysis | Held — Chavez does not control Delaware state McWane analysis; the doctrines differ in purpose and remedies, so Chavez is not an extraordinary change requiring vacatur |
| Whether Marquinez (class‑action tolling) affects the rationale for the 2013 McWane dismissal | Marquinez clarified that cross‑jurisdictional tolling continued until June 3, 2010, and, coupled with Chavez/Gramercy, alters the legal basis that supported the 2013 dismissal | Marquinez concerns tolling and limitations; the 2013 dismissal rested on forum‑non‑conveniens McWane principles, not tolling, so Marquinez does not undermine the dismissal | Held — Marquinez’s tolling holding does not undercut McWane‑based dismissal here; it was not an extraordinary ground to reopen the judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell‑Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281 (Del. 1970) (Delaware doctrine permitting stay/dismissal of second‑filed actions to avoid duplicative litigation)
- Lisa, S.A. v. Mayorga, 993 A.2d 1042 (Del. 2010) (extended McWane to situations where earlier‑filed action was dismissed with prejudice)
- Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (federal first‑filed rule ordinarily calls for stay/transfer; dismissal with prejudice is usually abuse of discretion; held prior Louisiana timeliness dismissal lacked preclusive effect under federal common law)
- Marquinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 183 A.3d 704 (Del. 2018) (Del. en banc) (held cross‑jurisdictional class‑action tolling continued until Texas state court denied certification on June 3, 2010)
- Gramercy Emerging Mkts. Fund v. Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C., 173 A.3d 1033 (Del. 2017) (when Delaware is second‑filed but prior action was dismissed before filing, analyze Cryo‑Maid factors without McWane’s strong presumption)
- In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2013) (post‑judgment change in law justified relief where similarly situated tort victims received inconsistent outcomes)
- Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 (1965) (Supreme Court vacated prior denial of certiorari and required uniform statutory interpretation across circuits)
- Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975) (Rule 60(b) relief granted where related litigation produced a change in state law that caused inconsistent results for plaintiffs injured in the same accident)