Edna A. Martinez v. State Office of Risk Management
04-14-00558-CV
Tex. App.May 15, 2019Background
- Edna Martinez, a state employee, sued the State Office of Risk Management (SORM) claiming a compensable workplace injury after she fell while working at home.
- The key legal question was whether Martinez’s failure to obtain prior written authorization to work from home (per Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 658.010, 659.018) precluded her injury from being compensable under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.
- The court of appeals (SORM II) affirmed summary judgment for SORM, holding the Government Code provisions limit scope of employment by requiring prior written authorization to work at home, and Martinez admitted she had no such approval.
- Martinez argued the Government Code provisions conflict with the Labor Code’s definition of “course and scope of employment” (Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(12)), which expressly includes activities at “other locations,” and thus working from home can be within scope even without prior authorization.
- Justice Liza A. Rodriguez (dissenting) would hold the Labor Code definition controls because it is the more specific provision for compensability and that the summary judgment record contains disputed facts about whether Martinez had employer authority to work from home.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gov’t Code §§ 658.010 & 659.018 bar compensability when employee worked at home without prior written authorization | Martinez: Labor Code’s definition of course and scope of employment (includes “other locations”) allows work-from-home injuries to be compensable; Gov’t Code shouldn’t negate this | SORM: Gov’t Code requires prior written authorization to work from home and thus limits scope of employment; absence of authorization precludes compensability | Panel: Gov’t Code limits employment scope; Martinez’s admitted lack of authorization meant no compensable injury (dissent disagrees) |
| Whether the statutes conflict and, if so, which controls | Martinez: Conflict exists; Labor Code (specific to compensability) should control | SORM: No conflict; if irreconcilable, Gov’t Code is more specific and controls | Dissent: Labor Code is the more specific statute for compensability and should control; court disagreed in panel opinion |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given record evidence about authorization to work from home | Martinez: Evidence (agency policy, hearing officer’s finding) creates fact issues about employer authorization | SORM: Martinez admitted no prior written authorization; summary judgment appropriate | Dissent: Genuine fact issue exists about authority to work from home; summary judgment improper |
| Standard of review for summary judgment and inference-drawing | Martinez: Court must view evidence favorably to nonmovant and draw reasonable inferences for Martinez | SORM: Relied on Martinez’s admission re: authorization to support no dispute of material fact | Panel: Applied summary judgment standard and found no genuine issue; dissent would apply same standard but reach different factual-conclusion outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (standard for reviewing traditional summary judgment and inferences for nonmovant)
- State Office of Risk Management v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. 2017) (Texas Supreme Court clarifying compensable injury requires both arising out of and within course and scope of employment)