Edgar Tamayo v. William Stephens, Director
740 F.3d 986
5th Cir.2014Background
- In 1994 Tamayo shot and killed HPD Officer Guy Gaddis while handcuffed in a patrol car; he was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death; the Texas CCA affirmed.
- Tamayo pursued state and federal habeas relief raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), an Atkins (mental retardation) claim, and Vienna Convention consular-notification claims; many state filings were dismissed as successive.
- The federal district court denied habeas relief in 2011; the Fifth Circuit denied a COA on most claims and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2012.
- After McQuiggin v. Perkins (2013), Tamayo filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in district court (Jan. 20, 2014) arguing Perkins excused prior procedural default/untimeliness; he filed the motion two days before a scheduled execution.
- The district court denied Rule 60(b) relief as untimely but granted a COA to appeal; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the district court had jurisdiction but did not abuse its discretion in denying relief as not filed within a "reasonable time."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Rule 60(b) motion was a "second or successive" habeas petition | Tamayo: motion challenged procedural ruling (timeliness/default) and thus is a Rule 60(b) procedural attack, not a successive petition | State: motion sought to relitigate merits/untimeliness and should be treated as successive requiring authorization | Court: motion was a permissible Rule 60(b) procedural challenge; district court had jurisdiction |
| Whether McQuiggin v. Perkins change in law supports Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Tamayo: Perkins excused AEDPA timeliness/default for actual-innocence claims, so his Atkins/innocence-related default should be excused | State: change in decisional law does not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" for Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Court: following Gonzalez and Fifth Circuit precedent, change in decisional law is not an "extraordinary circumstance" to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether the Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a "reasonable time" | Tamayo: relied on Perkins and later IACHR decision as new developments justifying delay | State: Tamayo waited months after Perkins and filed two days before execution, so it was untimely | Court: motion was not filed within a reasonable time (filed ~8 months after Perkins, 2 days before execution); denial affirmed |
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief | Tamayo: district court should have granted relief in light of actual-innocence principles | State: district court properly exercised discretion to deny untimely Rule 60(b) motion | Court: no abuse of discretion; affirm denial and deny stay of execution |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes Rule 60(b) procedural challenges from successive habeas petitions)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual-innocence gateway can excuse AEDPA statute-of-limitations in first habeas petitions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requires deficient performance and prejudice)
- Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2012) (change in decisional law does not constitute extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6))
- Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (standard of review: Rule 60(b) relief is within district court's discretion)