904 F.3d 594
8th Cir.2018Background
- Edgar Martin was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced under the ACCA after the district court found he had at least three prior violent-felony convictions.
- Martin previously lost direct appeal and an initial § 2255 motion; he obtained permission to file a successive § 2255 motion after Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause.
- Martin contends two Arkansas first-degree terroristic threatening convictions do not qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the force clause, relying on Descamps and Mathis to argue the statute is indivisible and overbroad.
- The government maintains those convictions qualify under the ACCA force clause and that the modified categorical approach may be used to examine state-court records showing Martin threatened physical harm.
- The Eighth Circuit panel applied its controlling precedent (Boaz I and Myers), used the modified categorical approach, reviewed conviction records showing threats to kill or cause injury, and concluded the convictions were violent felonies.
- The court alternatively held Descamps and Mathis do not create a new retroactive rule for successive § 2255 relief and affirmed the district court’s order denying relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ark. Code § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) is divisible so the modified categorical approach may be used | Martin: Each subsection is indivisible and overbroad; Mathis/Descamps preclude modified categorical use | Government: Boaz I and Myers control; the statute is divisible and records can show which alternative offense was convicted | Held: Statute is divisible; modified categorical approach applies (Myers/Boaz controlling) |
| Whether Martin’s terroristic threatening convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the force clause | Martin: Convictions may encompass non-violent means; thus not necessarily violent felonies | Government: Records (informations) show threats to kill/physical injury, satisfying the force clause | Held: State-court records show threats of physical harm; convictions qualify as violent felonies |
| Whether Descamps/Mathis require revisiting Boaz I and prior ACCA force-clause analysis | Martin: Descamps/Mathis change the categorical/modified categorical analysis and render Boaz incorrect | Government: Descamps/Mathis do not undermine Boaz I for the force clause as applied; Myers rejects Martin’s claim | Held: Descamps/Mathis do not alter outcome here; Myers and Boaz govern |
| Whether Descamps/Mathis create a new retroactive rule allowing successive § 2255 relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) | Martin: Those decisions announce a new rule applicable retroactively | Government: They are statutory interpretive decisions, not new retroactive constitutional rules like Johnson | Held: Descamps/Mathis are not new retroactive constitutional rules; Martin is not eligible for successive § 2255 relief on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (interpreting limits on the modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (clarifying divisibility and distinguishing elements from means)
- Boaz v. United States, 884 F.3d 808 (8th Cir.) (holding Arkansas terroristic threatening can qualify under the force clause)
- Headbird v. United States, 813 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir.) (summarizing categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- United States v. Myers, 896 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.) (applying Mathis/Descamps issues and holding § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) divisible and that records showed violent threats)