Edgar Leal v. Eric Holder, Jr.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21193
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Edgar Leal, a Mexican national present in the U.S. without admission, pled guilty in Arizona to felony endangerment (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1201) and misdemeanor DUI. DHS initiated removal; Leal sought cancellation of removal.
- IJ pretermitted Leal’s cancellation application, finding felony endangerment is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Leal appealed to the BIA; the BIA published an opinion holding Arizona felony endangerment is a CIMT.
- Arizona felony endangerment (felony) requires recklessly creating a substantial, actual risk of imminent death to another person; recklessness includes conscious disregard of risk or unawareness due solely to voluntary intoxication.
- The BIA relied on the Attorney General’s Silva‑Trevino formulation that a CIMT requires reprehensible conduct plus some form of scienter; it found both elements satisfied by Arizona felony endangerment.
- Leal argued that (1) Arizona recklessness can be based on voluntary intoxication (unawareness), so the mens rea is insufficient for a CIMT; and (2) his conduct (DUI) did not necessarily create morally turpitudinous conduct.
- The Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA under Chevron, held felony endangerment is a CIMT because reckless conduct combined with a substantial, actual risk of imminent death is sufficiently reprehensible; the petition for review was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Leal’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona felony endangerment is categorically a CIMT | Recklessness can be predicated on voluntary intoxication (unawareness), so mens rea insufficient for CIMT | Statute requires recklessness (including conscious disregard or intoxication‑based unawareness) plus substantial actual risk of imminent death, which is reprehensible and meets CIMT | The BIA reasonably concluded felony endangerment is a CIMT; court defers under Chevron |
| Whether voluntary intoxication negates moral turpitude when recklessness is satisfied | Voluntary intoxication may produce unawareness and thus non‑culpable conduct | Voluntary intoxication that produces unawareness can be a proxy for conscious disregard when the actor chose to become excessively intoxicated | Excessive voluntary intoxication combined with creating a substantial actual risk of imminent death can constitute moral turpitude |
| Whether felony endangerment could be applied to non‑turpitudinous conduct (realistic possibility) | Pointed to plea colloquy suggesting simple DUI | Conviction necessarily admits elements—substantial, actual risk of imminent death—so statute is not routinely applied to non‑turpitudinous conduct | No realistic possibility statute would be applied to non‑turpitudinous conduct; CIMT classification stands |
| Whether the court should reject BIA because its analysis separated mens rea and actus reus | BIA allegedly analyzed mens rea and harm separately, misapplying precedent | BIA, when read as a whole, evaluated mens rea and resulting harm in combination and followed governing principles | BIA’s analysis sufficiently considered mens rea and harm; its conclusion is reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.) (discusses deference to BIA and moral turpitude definition)
- Uppal v. Holder, 605 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2010) (recklessness discussion and prior CIMT holdings)
- Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. en banc 2014) (assessment of mens rea and harm in CIMT analysis)
- Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (definition and categorical analysis for CIMT)
- Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding dangerous reckless conduct can be morally turpitudinous)
- Keungne v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 561 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (deference to BIA on reckless endangerment as CIMT)