Eddie Don Johnson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division, 03-15-00343-CV

Background

Plaintiff-appellant Eddie Don Johnson (TDCJ #364033) is a Texas inmate who was released to mandatory supervision in January 2004 and later had that administrative release revoked and was returned to TDCJ custody in 2005 after alleged violations tied to refusal to participate in the Super-Intensive Supervision Program (SISP) and electronic monitoring (EM).
Johnson sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice / Board of Pardons and Paroles in Travis County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (and assorted damages) challenging the procedures and legality of the SISP/EM condition and the revocation process, alleging due-process violations, gross negligence, and statutory/regulatory defects.
The State moved to dismiss (plea to the jurisdiction) arguing sovereign/immunity and lack of a justiciable claim; the trial court granted dismissal with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; that order operates as a final judgment.
Johnson appeals pro se, framing the primary issues as (1) denial of procedural due process in imposition of SISP/EM and in the revocation, (2) misuse of administrative rules and board procedures, and (3) alleged failures to exhaust or properly respond to administrative remedies and time-credit/process errors.
Administrative records in the record include parole certificates, SISP/EM terms, revocation warrants, hearing reports, grievance forms, and TDCJ/BPP internal memoranda documenting the SISP condition, revocation proceedings, and time-credit responses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Subject-matter jurisdiction	Johnson contends federal and state statutory and constitutional claims give the court jurisdiction to review BPP/TDCJ actions and seek declaratory relief	State argued courts lack jurisdiction over these administrative parole decisions or that sovereign/immunity or statutory framework precludes relief	Trial court: dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (final judgment)
Procedural due process in revocation	Johnson asserts he was denied adequate notice, opportunity to present mitigation, and meaningful hearing before SISP condition led to revocation	State relied on BPP/TDCJ procedures, preliminary/revocation hearing processes, and statutory/regulatory framework that supply process and justify administrative action	Court treated jurisdictional challenge as dispositive; record indicates administrative procedures were followed and dismissal affirmed as to jurisdictional defect
Validity/availability of administrative remedies / exhaustion	Johnson says agency failed to respond timely to administrative complaints (including time-credit disputes) and thus exhausted relief or tolling should apply	State points to administrative records showing responses, established grievance/time-credit procedures, and that statutory prerequisites (e.g., time-credit review) govern judicial review	Court found it lacked jurisdiction to grant requested relief; administrative remedy issues were not resolved by the district court prior to dismissal
Relief sought (declaratory/injunctive/monetary)	Johnson seeks declaratory judgment invalidating SISP/EM condition, injunction ordering release/withdrawal of revocation, and damages for alleged gross negligence	State asserts those remedies are unavailable in district court given statutory scheme, sovereign immunity, and/or nonjusticiable nature of discretionary parole determinations	Court dismissed the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; relief therefore denied by operation of that judgment

Key Cases Cited

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parole-revocation due-process protections — notice and opportunity to be heard)
Ex parte Stokes, 15 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (statutory prerequisites for time-credit complaints under postconviction procedures)
Ex parte Maldonado, 688 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (vague or conclusory habeas allegations do not warrant relief)
Ex parte Empey, 757 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (conclusory allegations insufficient for habeas relief)