Ed Wayt and Tex A. Wayt v. Phyllis I. Maschino (mem. dec.)
36A05-1702-CC-335
| Ind. Ct. App. | Dec 29, 2017Background
- Maschino (owner of Blish Street property) financed construction and equipment for a blasting business run by her son-in-law Ed and his wife Tex Wayt ("The Blast Shop"); parties had no written agreement and were family.
- Maschino made downpayment and took loans ($27,000 down, $80,000 and $120,000, plus guaranty of $50,000) and also made numerous loan payments and cash advances over years; Wayts made payments totaling $201,000 by 2012.
- Without Maschino’s consent the Wayts attempted to sell equipment to Crane Hill/Marshall Royalty for $70,000; Maschino locked them out and retained the equipment.
- Competing lawsuits ensued (claims of conversion, replevin, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract). Summary judgment resolved some claims between Maschino and Royalty; issues between Maschino and the Wayts proceeded to bench trial.
- After bench trial the trial court found Maschino had loaned $354,000, the Wayts had repaid $201,000, leaving $153,000 owed; the court offset $70,000 (value of equipment Maschino retained) and entered judgment for Maschino for $83,000 and ordered return of certain personal property.
- On appeal the Wayts challenged claims: that judgment was on claims not pled, statute of frauds, characterization of certain funds (guaranteed line of credit), amount of additional loans, and return/award of personal property. Court affirmed in part and remanded to clarify property return.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Maschino) | Defendant's Argument (Wayts) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could award loan repayment beyond the two large loans specified in complaint | Complaint alleged loans from 1999–2012; asserted breach for roughly $200,000 and thus included various payments/advances | Complaint only referred to $80k and $120k; other payments were beyond pleadings | Court held complaint put Wayts on notice that loans from 1999–2012 were at issue; judgment allowed as pled |
| Whether statute of frauds bars enforcement (one-year clause) | Agreement was oral but not subject to statute because it was possible to perform within one year; statute was not pled as affirmative defense | Oral agreement lacked repayment term and thus falls within one-year writing requirement | Issue waived (not pled); on merits court held expectation of >1 year insufficient to invoke statute of frauds |
| Whether $50,000 guaranty/line of credit was a loan by Maschino to Wayts | Maschino guaranteed/refinanced into her name and funds were used to pay operating expenses from Tex’s account, supporting characterization as funds to Wayts | Wayts: it was a revolving line of credit for the business, not a loan by Maschino; no proof Maschino was called as guarantor or amounts used | Court found evidence supported treating the funds as advances/loans to Wayts and included them in the accounting |
| Whether trial court miscalculated or lacked evidence for $77,000 in additional loans/advances | Maschino produced extensive financial records documenting numerous payments and cash loans exceeding $77,000; court credited part of that evidence | Wayts argued Maschino’s specified amounts didn’t equal $77,000 and some loans were to the corporate entity, not them personally | Court affirmed that $77,000 finding was within the evidence and that corporate-entity argument was waived and inadequately developed on appeal |
| Whether trial court erred by ordering return of only three personal-property items | Maschino offered to return items; court ordered return of three items; may have considered other items as an implicit offset | Wayts sought return of many additional items; argued court intended full return | Court found it likely the omission was oversight; remanded to clarify ownership/return of remaining personal property |
Key Cases Cited
- Mysliwy v. Mysliwy, 953 N.E.2d 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (two-tiered clear-error review for findings and judgment)
- Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 944 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (standards for clearly erroneous findings and improper legal standards)
- Carmer v. Carmer, 45 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (role and purpose of special findings and conclusions under T.R. 52(A))
- Tobin v. Ruman, 819 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (narrow application of one-year clause of statute of frauds)
- Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that must be pled)
