Echols v. Echols, 2022 Ohio 1719

March 30, 2020: Robert L. Echols Jr. (son) sued his mother, Sellie Echols, over Clark Road property where he operated a forklift sales/repair business; claims included promissory estoppel, breach, fraud, unjust enrichment and sought a preliminary injunction.
Geauga Public Health and the U.S. EPA investigated the property and found liquid hazardous waste (EPA removed liquids) and remaining solid hazardous/solid waste (batteries, scrap tires, machinery) subject to Ohio EPA / county cleanup orders.
Trial court denied preliminary injunction, and on March 19, 2021 granted summary judgment for Sellie; she moved to appoint a receiver (April 2021) to remove/market/dispose of waste.
May 26, 2021: court granted motion to appoint a receiver but deferred selection; son’s counsel withdrew (June 2021).
November 2, 2021 hearing before a magistrate: son sought a continuance, objected to appointing defense counsel Daniel Mamrack as receiver, then left the hearing; magistrate recommended Mamrack.
December 27, 2021: trial court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation, appointed Mamrack as receiver, denied continuance, and found the son impliedly consented; son appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appointing a receiver was an abuse of discretion and whether the court erred by denying a continuance	Echols: appointment was unnecessary and denial of a continuance was prejudicial; hearing should have been continued to allow counsel	Sellie/EPA: environmental orders, ongoing deposits, and public‑health risk required prompt receivership; delay would aggravate risk	Court: no abuse of discretion; extraordinary environmental circumstances and delay justified immediate receivership and denial of continuance
Whether appointment of appellee’s counsel (Mamrack) as receiver violated R.C. 2735.02 (consent)	Echols: he did not consent (expressly) and statute requires affirmative consent; appointing opposing counsel is improper	Sellie: consent can be implied by conduct; Mamrack’s nomination was appropriate and necessary	Court: Son’s conduct (participation then abandonment of objections) implied consent; appointment permissible
Whether Mamrack’s appointment posed ethical conflicts under Ohio Prof. Cond. Rules (1.7, 3.7)	Echols: conflict of interest and potential need for Mamrack to testify disqualify him	Sellie: speculative and premature; Mamrack’s role is to carry out judgment and compliance duties	Court: Echols lacks standing to assert intra‑client conflicts; potential testimony is speculative and not a per se disqualifier

Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Hwy. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 49 N.E.2d 759 (1943) (order appointing receiver is reviewable as affecting a substantial right)
Hoiles v. Watkins, 157 N.E. 557 (1927) (receivership is an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring necessity)
State ex rel. Keith v. McMonagle, 816 N.E.2d 597 (2004) (orders that contemplate further action are not final appealable judgments)
Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 573 N.E.2d 62 (1991) (trial court has broad discretion to appoint or refuse a receiver)
Unger v. State, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981) (continuance rulings rest within trial court’s sound discretion and turn on circumstances presented)
Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992) (strangers to an attorney‑client relationship generally lack standing to assert conflicts)
Cuyahoga Cty. Case Mgt. v. Clark Industrial Insulation Co., 172 N.E.3d 448 (2021) (necessity for receivership often requires clear and convincing evidence)