Eaton v. Penn-America Insurance
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24049
| 1st Cir. | 2010Background
- Plaintiff Zachary Eaton sued Penn-America Insurance Company after a nightclub incident in Orono, Maine involving a bouncer and an unruly patron.
- The club's bouncer used force to eject the patron, and during the ensuing altercation a door was kicked open, injuring Eaton.
- Albenco, Inc. d/b/a Ushuaia was insured by Penn-America; judgment against Albenco was entered for $125,000 with Eaton seeking coverage under Penn-America.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Penn-America, concluding the assault-and-battery exclusion barred coverage.
- The First Circuit reviews de novo the policy interpretation under Maine law, applying Erie and related First Circuit precedent.
- The court affirms the district court’s ruling, holding the assault-and-battery exclusion bars coverage for damages arising from the incident.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the assault-and-battery exclusion bar coverage here? | Eaton contends exclusion does not apply to negligent or non-intentional conduct. | Penn-America argues injuries arose from a physical altercation and are excluded. | Yes; exclusion applies to injuries arising from the altercation. |
| Are the door opening and the assault two independent acts? | Bouncer's door-opening is an independent act from the assault. | The door dislodgement occurred contemporaneously with the assault and is part of the same event. | Independent acts test fails; injuries arise from the assault. |
| Must the plaintiff prove intent to injure for the exclusion to apply? | Intent to injure is required for assault and battery to trigger the exclusion. | The exclusion covers physical altercations regardless of intent and even negligent conduct. | Intent is not required; the exclusion covers negligent as well as intentional acts. |
| Is Penuche's distinguishable from the present case? | Penuche's could yield coverage where actions were unintentional. | Penuche's language is narrower and not controlling here; the broader exclusion applies. | Distinguishable; the present exclusion is broader and dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84 (1st Cir.2002) (courts should avoid unnecessary elaboration when the reasoning is solid)
- Maurice v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.2000) (recited approach to reviewing a trial court's decision)
- Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.1998) (principles for summarizing and applying precedent)
- Bucci v. Essex Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 285 (1st Cir.2005) (discusses scope of assault-and-battery exclusion)
- United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Penuche's, Inc., 128 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1997) (compare narrower exclusion language with broader policy terms)
- First Oak Brook Corp. v. Comly Holding Corp., 93 F.3d 92 (3d Cir.1996) (assault-and-battery exclusion dispositive in similar context)
- Williamson v. Kovac, 591 So.2d 788 (La.Ct.App.1991) (supports broad interpretation of exclusion language)