Easterling v. Adams, 2:14-cv-01392

Background

Clarence Easterling, a Wisconsin state prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being denied visitation with his daughter; complaint filed November 3, 2014.
In 2004–2005, visitation requests were denied by Pamela Fuller, Philip Kingston, a probation/parole agent (Jane Doe), and appeals dismissed by Michael Thurmer and Richard Raemisch. Kingston informed Easterling in 2005 that visitation would be allowed only after completion of recommended programming.
Easterling alleges continued ineligibility for visitation thereafter and a separate 2013 denial at WSPF, whose inmate-complaint dismissal was affirmed by Cindy O’Donnell.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing (1) claims against the 2004–2005 defendants are time-barred and (2) O’Donnell lacks personal involvement.
The court concluded the continuing-violation doctrine and estoppel do not save the 2004–2005 claims and dismissed Thurmer, Raemisch, Fuller, Kingston, and Jane Doe as time-barred.
The court dismissed Easterling’s money-damages and personal-capacity claims against O’Donnell for lack of personal involvement but left possible prospective/injunctive claims against her undismissed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether claims against 2004–2005 defendants are time-barred	Easterling: each day of continued ineligibility is a fresh violation restarting the statute of limitations	Defs: injury occurred when visit request was denied in 2004–2005; suit filed beyond 6-year limitations	Court: statute began at denial; continuing-violation doctrine does not apply; claims time-barred
Whether Kingston’s 2005 letter estops defendants from raising statute of limitations	Easterling: Kingston’s letter fraudulently implied programming could be completed in time, so estoppel applies	Defs: letter truthfully said visits allowed only after recommended programming; not misleading or fraudulent	Court: letter not fraudulent or misleading; no estoppel; claims remain time-barred
Whether O’Donnell is liable based on affirming 2013 grievance dismissal	Easterling: O’Donnell’s affirmation and related policies caused violations	O’Donnell: grievance review alone does not create personal liability under § 1983	Court: grievance handling alone insufficient; plaintiff alleges no non-grievance conduct by O’Donnell—dismiss personal-capacity and damages claims
Whether injunctive or prospective relief against O’Donnell may proceed	Easterling: state official can be sued for injunctive relief	Defs: unclear whether remaining defendants can provide relief; defendants requested dismissal of personal-capacity damages claims	Court: did not dismiss O’Donnell from the case entirely; prospective/injunctive claims not dismissed at this time

Key Cases Cited

Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1997) (statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Wisconsin).
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006) (continuing-violation doctrine applies only where state actor’s policy creates fresh violations each day).
Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing lingering effects from fresh acts for limitations purposes).
Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing when each day may constitute a fresh infliction restarting limitations).
Flenner v. Sheahan, 107 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (standard for Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings).
Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2005) (courts must view pleadings in the light most favorable to nonmovant on Rule 12(c)).
Higgins v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (personal involvement required for § 1983 liability).
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling on a grievance does not, by itself, render a defendant personally liable under § 1983).
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009) (grievance-screening officials may be liable only in narrow circumstances such as shredding grievances or interfering with relief delivery).