Earle J. Fisher v. Tre Hargett - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part, 604 S.W.3d 381

Plaintiffs challenged the Secretary of State and Coordinator of Elections’ narrow interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201(5)(C)–(D), which limited absentee-by-mail eligibility during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The trial court issued a temporary injunction requiring Defendants to allow any eligible voter who determines they are at risk from COVID-19 (or who care for someone at risk) to vote absentee by mail.
This interlocutory appeal asks whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction; the standard of review is deferential abuse-of-discretion.
The court applied the Anderson–Burdick framework to assess whether Tennessee’s absentee rules burden the right to vote and, if so, whether the State’s interests justify that burden.
Plaintiffs presented epidemiological testimony that in-person voting during the pandemic posed a meaningful risk and that mail voting reduces interpersonal contact; Defendants relied on evidence about administrative costs, feasibility, and potential fraud.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction?	Trial court properly found a moderate burden and issued injunction to protect voting rights during pandemic.	Injunction was overbroad and improper; trial court applied wrong standard.	No abuse of discretion; injunction was appropriate under the record.
What level of burden does the absentee-rule interpretation impose under Anderson–Burdick?	The interpretation imposes a moderate burden because many have few alternative means to vote safely.	The burden is minimal; public-health choices of individuals, not state action, explain risks.	The court treated the burden as moderate.
Do the State’s asserted interests (fraud prevention, fiscal/administrative feasibility) justify the burden?	State failed to present credible evidence that fraud or costs justify denying absentee access; other states’ experience undermines claims.	Broad absentee access would cause chaos, excessive cost, and increased fraud risk.	Defendants’ evidence was not persuasive or sufficiently tailored; interests did not outweigh the burden.
Is the injunction facial or appropriately limited?	Relief is as-applied and limited to similarly situated voters during the pandemic.	Injunction is too broad for an as-applied challenge.	Injunction is limited to the particular circumstances presented (pandemic-related risk) and not a facial invalidation.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (establishing the Anderson–Burdick balancing test for election regulations)
Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Anderson–Burdick burden analysis)
Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding absentee deadline where administrative burdens justified the rule)
Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2020) (outlining injunction factors in election context)
City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013) (recognizing fraud prevention as an important state interest in election regulation)
Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205 (Tenn. 2019) (standard for reviewing temporary injunctions; abuse-of-discretion review)
Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (discussion of appellate review of discretionary rulings)
Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016) (considering other states’ practices when assessing burdens on voting)