531 P.3d 488
Idaho2023Background
- Eagle Rock Timber won a public-works contract to reconstruct 1.6 miles of Chapin Lane in Teton County; the contract incorporated many documents (Agreement, General Conditions, Supplementary Conditions, drawings, etc.).
- During construction Eagle Rock found far more unsuitable base material than bid estimates; it says County engineer Darryl Johnson told them to remove it and that the County would “make it right.”
- Eagle Rock submitted a change order that Teton County approved for additional infill material, but the County refused to pay Eagle Rock’s charge for removal of the excess unsuitable material, citing the Contract’s written-change requirement.
- Teton County moved for summary judgment twice: the district court denied the first motion (genuine factual disputes about oral waiver/authorization) but granted the second, ruling Johnson lacked actual or apparent authority to bind the County.
- Eagle Rock sought leave to amend to add Johnson individually; the district court denied leave and entered judgment for the County and awarded attorney fees to the County.
- The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and the denial of leave to amend, vacated the attorney-fee award, affirmed that ratification was not properly considered below, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on agency/authority grounds | Johnson told Eagle Rock to remove material and promised County would “make it right”; genuine issues of fact exist about actual/apparent authority and oral waiver | Contract’s written-change clause and contract terms preclude Johnson from binding the County; no authority as a matter of law | Reversed: genuine issues of material fact exist about Johnson’s role and authority; summary judgment improper |
| Whether ratification by the County could be considered on summary judgment | Eagle Rock argued County ratified Johnson’s actions | County argued ratification was not pleaded and thus beyond scope | Affirmed district court: ratification was beyond pleadings and improperly considered below |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend to add Johnson | Eagle Rock: County changed its position in second MSJ about Johnson’s authority, so amendment was timely and should be freely allowed | County: delay and prejudice justified denial | Reversed: denial was conclusory and abused discretion; leave to amend should have been freely given |
| Whether attorney fees to County were proper | Eagle Rock: County did not properly prevail below; fees improper | County: prevailed below and claim was a commercial transaction under I.C. §12-120(3) | Reversed: fee award vacated because County is not prevailing party at this stage; remand allows reconsideration after final adjudication |
Key Cases Cited
- Chamberlain v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604 (agent/principal conduct binds principal)
- Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Fam. Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317 (existence of agency is generally a jury question)
- Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728 (acts within scope of agency affect principal's liability)
- Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495 (disputed agency is a fact question for the trier of fact)
- DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749 (factors for denying leave to amend; timeliness not dispositive)
- Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25, 165 Idaho 690 (grounds for denying amendment include prejudice and futility)
- Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109 (agency/apparent authority principles)
- Nelson v. Kaufman, 166 Idaho 270 (apparent authority analysis)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (leave to amend should be freely given absent good reasons)
