Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9295
| 2d Cir. | 2015Background
- Doris Pike admitted to Corry Manor in Oct 2010; Levere Pike signed admission agreement to pay from Doris's assets.
- After Doris's death (Jan 2011), Corry Manor claimed ~$8,000 and hired Kennedy to collect.
- Kennedy sent a NY debt-collection letter to Eades in July 2011 asserting possible personal liability.
- Kennedy sent a summons/complaint to Plaintiffs in NY for Corry Manor in Dec 2011; Plaintiffs sued Kennedy in WDNY.
- District Court dismissed; held no personal jurisdiction over Kennedy and the alleged debt may not be a FDCPA debt; NHRA preemption and adequacy of claims questioned.
- Appeal: court affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands for further proceedings on certain FDCPA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over Kennedy. | Kennedy transacted business in NY via letter, calls, and suit. | Contacts were insufficient or not purposefully directed at NY. | Yes, NY CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction exists; due process satisfied. |
| Whether the $8,000 obligation is a 'debt' under the FDCPA. | Obligation arose from nursing home services and is a consumer debt. | Indigent-support statutes complicate characterization; may not be a debt. | The obligation constitutes a debt under the FDCPA. |
| Whether Kennedy’s Pennsylvania lawsuit and collection actions violate the FDCPA. | Actions were false/deceptive or unfair under multiple FDCPA provisions. | Actions were lawful debt collection; no FDCPA violation shown. | Most FDCPA claims rejected; two wage-liability and lien-threat claims remanded for district court to address. |
| Whether the NHRA preempts Pennsylvania indigent-support statute. | NHRA preempts state indigent-support drives against residents. | NHRA does not preempt; no irreconcilable conflict. | NHRA does not preempt Pennsylvania indigent-support statute in this context. |
| Whether new FDCPA theories (e.g., §§ 1692e(7), 1692i) were properly pled and considered. | Plaintiffs sought to raise additional FDCPA theories. | Not pleaded in amended complaint; not properly before court. | Not considered on appeal; remand possible for leave to amend. |
Key Cases Cited
- Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, S.A.L., 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013) (minimum contacts and reasonableness in due process for specific jurisdiction)
- Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (long-arm and purposeful availment; totalizing contacts analysis)
- Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460 (N.Y. 1988) (purposeful activities and transacting business in forum state)
- Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1992) (receipt of collection notice central to FDCPA claim)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (U.S. 2014) (minimum contacts general jurisdiction framework)
- Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012) (least sophisticated consumer standard for FDCPA deception)
- Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2006) (frivolous or baseless claims under FDCPA require more than mere failure to plead defenses)
- Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (U.S. 2010) (lawyers are debt collectors when regularly engaged in litigation to collect debts)