E. Ron Pickard v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board
424 S.W.3d 511
Tenn.2013Background
- The Sanctuary sued the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board and the Department of Environment and Conservation over a final discharge permit for Tennessee Materials' limestone quarry near Horse Creek.
- The Sanctuary sought administrative review (Board direct permit appeal) and also sought a declaratory order interpreting the Antidegradation Rule.
- The Board dismissed the declaratory-order petition as premature and TDEC issued a final permit in March 2009; the Sanctuary then filed a direct permit appeal and again sought a declaratory order.
- ALJ dismissed the declaratory order; the Sanctuary filed chancery court petitions under 4-5-225; the trial court ruled in favor of the Sanctuary on issues related to the Antidegradation Rule.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sanctuary properly pursued a declaratory judgment; this Court granted permission to review the exclusive-review framework under Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-105(i).
- The Supreme Court held that § 69-3-105(i) is the exclusive avenue for administrative and judicial review of a permit decision, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is §69-3-105(i) the exclusive avenue for review of permit decisions? | Pickard argued for alternative routes under 4-5-223/225. | TDEC/Board argued exclusive permit-appeal form governs review. | Yes; §69-3-105(i) is exclusive. |
| Must administrative remedies be exhausted before seeking judicial review of a permit decision? | Exhaustion not required in context; Declaratory Judgment allowed. | Exhaustion required prior to court review under the exclusive scheme. | Yes; exhaustion required. |
| Can a declaratory-judgment petition under 4-5-225 be entertained before Board resolution of the permit appeal? | Board review not necessary to raise Antidegradation issues. | Board must address permit issues first; declaratory relief premature. | No; should await Board proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008) (exhaustion doctrine applies; prudential requirements may apply)
- Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216 (Tenn. 2010) (exhaustion is mandatory where statutorily required)
- Nashville Mobilphone Co. v. Atkins, 536 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn. 1976) (agency interpretations of own statutes subject to de novo review)
- In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. 2012) (interpret related statutes in light of each other)
