E.M. v. Lewisville Independent School District
4:15-cv-00564
E.D. Tex.Jan 9, 2017Background
- E.M., a minor with a disability, resided in Lewisville ISD and pursued two IDEA due-process hearing requests; the first hearing decision (May 22, 2015) found LISD provided FAPE.
- While the first hearing was pending, E.M. filed a second due-process request (March 26, 2015). A Hearing Officer dismissed the second request on August 21, 2015, as precluded by the first proceeding.
- E.M. appealed the first hearing decision to federal court; separately, E.M. sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the second proceeding, which the Hearing Officer did not rule on.
- E.M. filed an amended complaint in federal court on December 10, 2015, challenging the August 21, 2015 dismissal.
- LISD moved to partially dismiss the Second Amended Original Complaint, arguing the IDEA’s 90-day filing period bars E.M.’s appeal; the court granted dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the IDEA 90‑day filing period is jurisdictional | The 90‑day limit is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar, and LISD waived it by not pleading it as an affirmative defense | The 90‑day limit is mandatory and jurisdictional, so failure to file within 90 days deprives the court of subject‑matter jurisdiction | The court held the 90‑day limit is jurisdictional and E.M.’s appeal was untimely, so the court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction |
| Whether a Motion for Reconsideration tolled the 90‑day period | Reconsideration under Texas rules or the administrative code tolled the filing deadline | Texas law and the administrative code do not permit tolling here; no rule allows reconsideration of a hearing officer’s decision or tolling absent a modified judgment | The court held no tolling occurred: the hearing officer did not modify the decision and Texas law provides no basis to toll the 90‑day period |
Key Cases Cited
- Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal standard for subject‑matter jurisdiction)
- Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional challenges under Rule 12(b)(1) addressed before merits)
- Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (standards for considering jurisdictional materials beyond the complaint)
- Barrera‑Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1996) (same)
- Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994) (pleaded facts are accepted as true on a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack)
- Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff bears burden to establish subject‑matter jurisdiction)
