E.F. v. The New York City Department of Education, 1:21-cv-00419

Plaintiffs (three minors — E.F., A.S., L.P. — and Disability Rights New York) sued the NYC Department of Education, City of New York, and DOE Chancellor, alleging District 75 on Staten Island unlawfully segregates students with disabilities and provides inferior educational programming and resources.
Allegations: standalone and co‑located District 75 classrooms are segregated, often lack facilities/extracurriculars, use a vocational/less rigorous curriculum, and limit access to a standard diploma; Plaintiffs seek relief under the ADA, Section 504, IDEA, and the NYCHRL.
Individual plaintiff facts: E.F. (attends District 75 after an FBA/recommendation; limited peer interaction and low academic progress); A.S. (was in District 75 but moved to a community school after a classroom observation found segregation unnecessary); L.P. (has remained in community school after mediation secured supports).
Plaintiffs did not allege they exhausted IDEA administrative remedies before suing; Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction based on IDEA exhaustion doctrine.
The district court found the core of Plaintiffs’ claims challenge the provision of a FAPE, concluded exhaustion was required and not shown, rejected the claimed systemic‑violation exception (insufficient factual allegations of a DOE policy to unnecessarily segregate), questioned class‑representative standing for A.S. and L.P., and granted dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ADA/§504/NYCHRL claims can proceed without exhausting IDEA administrative remedies	Plaintiffs argue their suit challenges disability discrimination and systemic segregation, not the provision of FAPE, so §1415(l) does not bar their claims	Defendants argue the gravamen of the suit is denial of FAPE (per Fry), so IDEA exhaustion is required	Court: The gravamen challenges FAPE; exhaustion under IDEA §1415(l) required; plaintiffs did not exhaust; dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
Whether the systemic‑violation (futility) exception to exhaustion applies	Plaintiffs claim a systemic DOE practice of unnecessary segregation that would make exhaustion futile	Defendants argue complaint lacks facts showing a DOE policy or practice to unnecessarily segregate; allegations show individualized placements	Court: Exception not available — complaint lacks factual allegations of a systemic policy; individualized decisions predominate; exhaustion not excused
Class‑representation/standing of A.S. and L.P.	Plaintiffs assert the named minors represent the class of Staten Island District 75 students and those at risk	Defendants assert A.S. and L.P. are not District 75 students and thus lack standing to represent the putative class	Court: A.S. and L.P. lack the same injury as the putative class and do not appear to have standing as class representatives

Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S. 154 (2017) (establishes framework for when IDEA exhaustion is required by asking whether the gravamen of the complaint is denial of FAPE)
Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002) (failure to exhaust IDEA remedies deprives federal court of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
Parent/Professional Advocacy League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019) (applies Fry to find exhaustion required where plaintiffs challenge segregated alternative schools and unequal educational services)
J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (IDEA exhaustion may be excused when administrative procedures cannot provide adequate relief for systemic violations)
Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2007) (discusses circumstances in which exhaustion is futile or inadequate)
M.G. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (hearing officers lack power to alter district‑wide policies; supports analysis of when systemic claims may excuse exhaustion)
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (standard for Rule 12(b)(1) subject‑matter jurisdiction review)