911 F.3d 938
8th Cir.2019Background
- E.D., a child with Down Syndrome, began kindergarten at Palmyra Elementary; his parents sought classroom accommodations but insisted on placement in a regular classroom (a §504-style plan) rather than special-education classes (an IEP).
- School offered two IEPs that provided the requested iPad and accommodation supports but required special-education placement; parents rejected both and withdrew E.D. from school two weeks into first grade.
- Parents sued the district under Section 504, Title II of the ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment seeking iPad integration, testing-format changes, and extended time—relief tied to access to a free public education.
- Palmyra moved for summary judgment, arguing the parents failed to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies because the requested relief was also available under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).
- The district court granted summary judgment for the school; the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether exhaustion was required and whether a categorical exception applied for parents who refused IDEA services.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exhaustion under IDEA §1415(l) is required when plaintiffs never accepted or sought IDEA services | Parents argued their refusal to accept IDEA services created a categorical exception to exhaustion | School argued exhaustion applies whenever sought relief is also available under IDEA, regardless of prior consent | Court held exhaustion is required; no categorical opt-out for refusing IDEA services |
| Whether the relief sought was "also available" under the IDEA (i.e., whether claim concerns denial of a FAPE) | Parents contended their claims were discrimination claims under §504/ADA, not FAPE claims | School contended the relief directly sought educational supports that an IEP could provide, thus implicating FAPE | Court held the relief sought concerned denial of a FAPE and so triggered IDEA exhaustion |
| Application of Fry’s two hypothetical questions to determine gravamen of the complaint | Parents argued their claims were simple discrimination and not school‑specific FAPE disputes | School argued parents could not bring the same claims outside a school context or on behalf of a non‑student adult | Court applied Fry’s hypotheticals, answered both questions in the negative, and found the gravamen was a FAPE denial |
| Whether parental lack of informed-consent under IDEA §1414(a)(1)(D) changes exhaustion requirement | Parents relied on consent language to assert refusal exempts them from administrative process | School argued consent requirement governs provision of services, not exhaustion of remedies in court | Court held lack of consent does not excuse exhaustion; §1414 consent provisions don’t negate §1415(l) exhaustion requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (establishes test for when IDEA exhaustion is required by asking if lawsuit seeks relief for denial of a FAPE using two hypotheticals)
- Nelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2018) (applies Fry and treats the hypotheticals as fact-intensive in assessing exhaustion)