306 F. Supp. 3d 1028
E.D. Ill.2018Background
- Dyson, owner of Jump N' Jam and lessee of adjacent property (1582 Huntington Dr.), applied in March–June 2015 to convert the premises into a banquet hall ("Atrium"); obtained building permits and spent ≈$150,000 renovating.
- Mayor Qualkinbush visited and discussed a liquor license; in late August 2015 city inspectors/engineers and Zoning Board indicated zoning issues and Barron stated no further permits would be issued until a business license was obtained.
- Dyson applied to the Zoning Board for a special-use permit; ZBA issued a 2–2 tie recommendation (unfavorable) and the city council adopted the recommendation in December 2015; city attorney denied business and liquor licenses.
- Dyson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging class-of-one equal protection, procedural and substantive due process, takings, and conspiracy; also asserted state-law tort claims.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court dismissed all federal claims for failure to state a plausible constitutional violation, declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, and granted leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class‑of‑one Equal Protection — whether Defendants irrationally targeted Dyson | Dyson says officials misled her, waited until she spent ≈$150,000, then raised zoning as pretext and acted out of animus tied to Alderman Collins; alleges pattern/hostility | City says zoning denial had a conceivable rational basis (property not zoned for banquet hall) and Dyson failed to identify similarly situated comparators | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to negate a conceivable rational basis and did not plead pattern/animus sufficient to overcome rational‑basis review |
| Substantive Due Process — whether action was arbitrary/‘shocks the conscience’ | Dyson claims arbitrary, oppressive conduct interfering with her use of leased property and investments | City argues zoning decisions are entitled to deference and plaintiff cannot show conscience‑shocking conduct or independent constitutional violation | Dismissed: no independent constitutional violation and plausible rational basis exists for land‑use decision |
| Procedural Due Process — whether Dyson was denied constitutionally adequate procedures | Dyson alleges procedural irregularities (ZBA quorum/vote issues, improper permits, delay/‘limbo’) deprived her of process | City notes Dyson received hearings, political/legislative decisionmaking in zoning limits procedural due‑process claims, and state remedies exist | Dismissed: alleged procedures were adequate for federal due process; state‑law errors don’t create federal due process violations |
| Takings — whether denial/deferment of permits/uses constitutes a taking | Dyson argues regulatory action deprived her of economically beneficial use of the leasehold (total taking or regulatory taking) | City contends no total taking alleged; plaintiff fails to identify zoning classification or show the property was rendered economically useless | Dismissed: no plausible Lucas total‑taking claim; partial‑taking factors insufficiently pleaded (no zoning classification/uses to assess Penn Central factors) |
| Conspiracy (§1983) — whether defendants agreed to deprive Dyson of rights | Dyson alleges defendants conspired from March 2015 to deny her license without basis | City argues conspiracy claim is conclusory and requires an underlying constitutional violation | Dismissed: conspiracy cannot stand absent a viable constitutional claim and allegations are speculative/non‑plausible |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards; conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. en banc split on class‑of‑one standard)
- Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (class‑of‑one without comparator where conduct implausibly rational)
- Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113 (plaintiff must negate any conceivable rational basis)
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (ripeness/exhaustion doctrine for takings)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (total regulatory taking rule)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (takings analysis; Penn Central framework applies to regulatory takings)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (multi‑factor test for regulatory takings)
- Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (absolute legislative immunity)
- Bogan v. Scott‑Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (legislative immunity for local legislators)
- River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164 (minimal procedural protections for legislative zoning decisions)