Dynamic Production, Inc. v. Cima Energy Ltd
4:17-cv-01032
S.D. Tex.Apr 19, 2018Background
- North Shore purportedly exercised an Option Agreement and drilled a producing well (the "Well") in Goliad County; production sales to CIMA began Jan 2010.
- Dynamic later received an oil & gas lease from the Harkins family for the parcel containing the Well (Dynamic Lease) and litigated ownership in the "Goliad Suit" against North Shore.
- The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held the Option Agreement did not include the Well tract and effectively reinstated Dynamic’s lease.
- Dynamic sued CIMA (Dec 19, 2016) for conversion and related claims based on CIMA’s purchases of production from North Shore.
- Magistrate Judge Palermo recommended splitting the summary-judgment outcomes: dismiss conversion claims older than two years before filing (limitations), grant conversion liability for purchases on/after Dec 19, 2014, and deny CIMA’s motion on other grounds; the district court adopted the R&R.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conversion claims against CIMA accruing before Dec 19, 2014 are tolled by pendency/outcome of Goliad Suit | Tolling applies because Dynamic was prevented from suing while ownership remained litigated; collateral estoppel/pendency justified tolling | Limitations began at each alleged conversion (each purchase); plaintiff was not prevented from suing CIMA and tolling doctrines do not apply | Claims for conversion arising before Dec 19, 2014 are time-barred; limitation accrues at each conversion and tolling was not available |
| Whether Dynamic established ownership of the Production as a matter of law | Dynamic’s lease and Texas Supreme Court decision establish ownership | CIMA argued burden wrongly placed on it and the Supreme Court decision did not affirmatively establish ownership | Court held Dynamic met its summary-judgment burden: Dynamic owns the production based on the lease terms and the Texas Supreme Court ruling |
| Whether CIMA qualifies as a good-faith purchaser under TBCC §2.403(b) because Dynamic "acquiesced"/entrusted production to North Shore | Dynamic did not acquiesce; it sued North Shore for conversion, so it did not entrust possession | CIMA contends Dynamic’s conduct/omissions and North Shore’s public filings could reasonably show entrustment, barring recovery | Court found no acquiescence after CIMA learned of Dynamic’s conversion suit (Sept 2011); Dynamic entitled to summary judgment on purchases on/after Dec 19, 2014; CIMA’s entrustment/ good-faith defense fails as to post-2014 purchases |
| Whether CIMA’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (attorneys’ fees) should be granted | N/A (no objection to R&R here) | CIMA sought dismissal of attorneys’ fees claim on pleadings | Court adopted R&R: CIMA’s motion denied as untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- Cavitt v. Amsler, 242 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (discusses narrow tolling where plaintiff is "prevented" from suing)
- Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996) (ownership need not be finally established for conversion claim to accrue)
- Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1997) (preferable to abate second suit rather than toll limitations because plaintiff chose to delay)
- SWEPI, L.P. v. Camden Res., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004) (collateral estoppel is an affirmative, waivable defense)
