Dye v. CNX Gas Company, LLC
291 Va. 319
| Va. | 2016Background
- Nella Kate Martin Dye sued for declaratory judgment that two 1886–1887 severance deeds conveying “all the coal and minerals” did not convey natural gas (including coal-bed methane) beneath portions of her land.
- The deeds at issue conveyed coal and “minerals” for two adjacent tracts; successors (Buckhorn and CNX) assert those conveyances included oil and gas and have leased gas rights.
- Dye alleged the term “minerals” was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence would show the grantors did not intend to convey gas; she owns surface/title interests from 1961 covering ~261 acres.
- Defendants demurred, relying on Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., arguing the word “minerals” unambiguously includes oil and gas as a matter of law.
- The circuit court sustained demurrers, finding the deeds unambiguous and controlling precedent required that “minerals” include gas; Dye’s amended complaint was likewise dismissed.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, applying Warren and the majority rule that a grant of “minerals” conveys oil and gas absent contrary deed language or sufficient ambiguity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the term “minerals” in 1886–1887 severance deeds includes oil and gas | Dye: term is ambiguous; extrinsic evidence would show grantors did not intend to convey gas | Buckhorn/CNX: under Warren, a conveyance of “minerals” includes oil and gas as a matter of law | Held: “Minerals” unambiguously includes oil and gas; demurrers sustained and complaint dismissed |
| Whether extrinsic evidence may be considered | Dye: ambiguity permits extrinsic evidence of intent | Defendants: no ambiguity, so extrinsic evidence inadmissible | Held: deed plain on its face; no need or permit to consider extrinsic evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (Va. 1936) (adopted majority rule that a conveyance of “minerals” includes oil and gas absent contrary intent)
- Amoco Production Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1980) (supports rule that “other minerals” includes oil and gas despite mining-language in deed)
- Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (Va. 1928) (distinguishable—addressed reservation of limestone where surface destruction would result)