Dwj v. Clb
363324
Mich. Ct. App.Nov 2, 2023Background
- Petitioner (Inkster city attorney) obtained an ex parte nondomestic personal protection order (PPO) against respondent after respondent sent repeated emails and attended public meetings criticizing petitioner and displaying offensive caricatures and a poster involving petitioner’s wife.
- Respondent had submitted FOIA requests and litigation against petitioner and sent frequent (weekly/daily) disparaging emails to petitioner and public officials beginning in 2020.
- Trial court issued the ex parte PPO on July 22, 2022; on a later motion to terminate the PPO the court denied termination, finding respondent’s repeated in-person and electronic targeting of petitioner constituted stalking and was not constitutionally protected because it violated petitioner’s “right to be left alone.”
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded petitioner was a public figure (a municipal public officer) and that respondent’s communications concerned matters of public concern—thus attracting heightened First Amendment protection.
- The court held the trial court misapplied Hill v. Colorado and erred in prioritizing petitioner’s “right to be left alone” over respondent’s political speech; it also found the communications did not qualify as fighting words.
- Court reversed the denial of the motion to terminate the PPO and remanded for entry of an order consistent with that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether respondent's repeated communications/supporting conduct could be restrained by a nondomestic PPO given the First Amendment | Communications were stalking/unconsented contact causing distress and not constitutionally protected; PPO valid | Communications were political speech about a public official on matters of public concern and thus protected | Held for defendant: speech was protected; trial court erred and abused discretion in denying termination of PPO |
| Whether petitioner is a public figure for First Amendment analysis | Petitioner argued he was a private figure | Respondent argued petitioner was a public figure (city attorney, public officer) | Held petitioner is a public figure as a matter of law (public officer) |
| Whether petitioner’s “right to be left alone” (Hill) justified restricting respondent’s speech | Petitioner relied on Hill to argue unwilling listener protection and place/right-to-be-left-alone interest | Respondent argued Hill is distinguishable (content-neutral place restriction) and emails/public criticism are avoidable and concern public issues | Held Hill was misapplied; the trial court overbroadly prioritized being "left alone" and could not override political-speech protections here |
| Whether the fighting-words exception removes First Amendment protection | Petitioner: epithet (“chump”) and provocative poster were designed to elicit confrontation and thus are fighting words | Respondent: statements are rhetorical hyperbole/satire and part of core political speech, not inherently likely to provoke violence | Held no fighting words; rhetoric and caricature did not reach the level that would forfeit First Amendment protection |
Key Cases Cited
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishes public-figure standard for defamation and heightened burden).
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upheld narrow place restriction balancing free speech and interest in avoiding unwanted close-proximity encounters).
- Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc., 471 Mich. 712 (2005) (purpose of PPO statute is to protect against malicious stalking; constitutional protections constrain PPO use).
- Buchanan v. Crisler, 323 Mich. App. 163 (2018) (PPOs may not be used to prohibit speech on public-figure matters of public concern).
- TM v. MZ (On Remand), 326 Mich. App. 227 (2018) (First Amendment exceptions and categories of unprotected speech).
- TT v. KL, 334 Mich. App. 413 (2020) (standard of review and procedures for nondomestic PPO practice).
- Ghanam v. Does, 303 Mich. App. 522 (2014) (satire, parody, and rhetorical hyperbole in political speech should not be treated as factual assertions).
