Dwight Tamplin, Jr. v. William Muniz
894 F.3d 1076
9th Cir.2018Background
- Tamplin was arrested for being a felon in possession of firearms and faced a Three Strikes sentence; he was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life on appeal.
- He invoked Faretta and secured pro se status on February 10, 2005; he represented himself for months thereafter.
- On June 22, 2005, Tamplin appeared with privately retained Greg Morris (who never filed a substitution motion and was suspended June 24); Tamplin learned Morris could not represent him and on June 30 stated he wished to continue pro se and signed a waiver.
- At a July 8 hearing the trial court denied Tamplin’s renewed Faretta request, reappointed the public defender, and continued the trial date; Tamplin objected but did not renew further objections.
- Appellate counsel did not raise the Faretta claim on direct appeal; Tamplin later raised it in state habeas, where the Superior Court rejected it as equivocal and/or waived by acquiescence; subsequent state courts denied habeas.
- The Ninth Circuit concluded the state court decisions were contrary to Faretta, found appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise the meritorious Faretta claim, and ordered habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tamplin made an unequivocal request to proceed pro se | Tamplin: he had been pro se since Feb 10 and unequivocally reaffirmed pro se status on June 30 and July 8 | State: hiring/appearing with Morris showed equivocation or a request for substitute counsel | Held for Tamplin: request was unequivocal and indistinguishable from Faretta |
| Whether Tamplin waived his Faretta right by acquiescing after the court denied his request | Tamplin: denial was a completed Sixth Amendment violation; subsequent silence did not waive the right | State: failure to renew objection and later acquiescence constituted waiver | Held for Tamplin: acquiescence rule contradicts Faretta; denial was complete when made |
| Whether the renewed Faretta request was untimely | Tamplin: he continuously represented himself or timely renewed on June 30 (weeks before trial) | State: July 8 request was near trial and untimely; trial court could consider timing | Held for Tamplin: request was timely; Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and found timeliness satisfied |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the Faretta claim on direct appeal | Tamplin: counsel neglected to investigate and failed to raise a clearly meritorious Faretta claim causing prejudice | State: counsel’s decision not to raise the issue was reasonable or harmless | Held for Tamplin: counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland; relief required |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when defendant makes knowing, voluntary, unequivocal request)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (standby counsel participation does not defeat Faretta right)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA standard: contrary or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference and "fairminded jurists" standard)
- Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261 (9th Cir. 1997) (pre-AEDPA but persuasive Ninth Circuit hold that a Faretta request made two weeks before trial can be timely)
