194 A.3d 953
N.H.2018Background
- Great Island (Lake Sunapee) has no public roads; the Circle Trail footpath circles the island and is used for access between properties.
- Original 1890 subdivisions of the Newbury side conveyed shoreline lots with deed clauses granting a right to cross lots by footpath to reach "wharf or wharves" on the shore; many deeds used broad wording (e.g., "all the lots").
- Steamboat service ended by the 1930s; the 1938 hurricane destroyed the steamboat wharves, which were never rebuilt; private docks and continued footpath use for various purposes followed.
- Trial court granted summary judgment that Newbury lot owners’ deeded easements survived destruction of the wharves; Stowell cross-appealed that the easements expired under the impossibility-of-purpose doctrine.
- After a bench trial and view, the trial court found certain defendants had prescriptive easements (but only those who testified) and ruled Stowell could unilaterally relocate the deeded easements; the parties appealed those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stowell) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deeded easements extinguished when steamboat wharves were destroyed | Easements were limited to the specific purpose of reaching steamboat wharves and expired when that purpose became impossible | Deeds conveyed broad rights to cross to reach wharves but language describes location, not a limited purpose; continued multi-purpose use supports survival | Court affirmed: easement language was descriptive, not a limited-purpose grant; impossibility doctrine did not apply |
| Whether prescriptive easements exist only for defendants who testified | Stowell argued easements are in gross/personal so only testifying persons proved adverse use | Defendants argued easements are appurtenant to lots; testimony by some owners can establish rights for lots even if some owners did not testify | Court vacated trial court’s limitation and remanded to determine whether prescriptive easements are appurtenant or in gross; if appurtenant, testimony from some owners may suffice |
| Whether Stowell may unilaterally relocate deeded easements | Stowell urged adoption of Restatement (Third) §4.8(3) to allow reasonable unilateral relocation by servient owner | Defendants argued New Hampshire common law forbids unilateral relocation once location is established or agreed | Court declined to adopt Restatement §4.8(3); vacated and remanded because trial court may have relied on that provision and failed to find whether location was fixed by agreement or long use |
| Whether Stowell may unilaterally relocate prescriptive easements | Stowell contended he could relocate all paths; defendants contested | Defendants sought protection of prescriptive rights from unilateral relocation | Court did not rule on relocation of prescriptive easements (trial court did not address); no opinion rendered on this issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Granite State Mgmt. & Res. v. City of Concord, 165 N.H. 277 (summary judgment standard)
- Cloutier v. State, 163 N.H. 445 (de novo review of law)
- Boissy v. Chevion, 162 N.H. 388 (adoption/discussion of impossibility-of-purpose doctrine)
- Jesurum v. WBTSCC Ltd. P’ship, 169 N.H. 469 (elements for prescriptive easement)
- Burcky v. Knowles, 120 N.H. 244 (easement in gross vests only in person granted)
- Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694 (appurtenant easement ties benefit to dominant estate)
- Duxbury-Fox v. Shakhnovich, 159 N.H. 275 (location of an easement may be fixed by subsequent agreement/use)
- Barton’s Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., 113 N.H. 333 (where deed unspecified, a reasonably convenient way is presumed)
- Seward v. Loranger, 130 N.H. 570 (construction of unspecified deeded rights-of-way)
- Sakansky v. Wein, 86 N.H. 337 (common-law rule preventing unilateral relocation once location established)