Dwight Douglas v. Charlotte Cornwell, E2016-00124-COA-R3-CV

Two parcels historically owned by Andrew Barnes; Charlotte Cornwell used her father’s driveway for ingress/egress since 1972 without an express easement.
Mediation in 2006 during a partition action contemplated granting Cornwell a non-exclusive right of way; mediation draft described a right of way to traverse along the driveway and run with the land.
Property was partitioned; deed conveying the property to third party Gary Sanders did not reference any easement; Sanders later sold to Dwight Douglas.
Plaintiffs filed suit in 2010 to enjoin Cornwell from using the driveway; Cornwell counterclaimed for an easement by prescription and, later, by implication, asserting continuous use since 1972.
Trial occurred May 1, 2015; stipulation established no prescriptive easement; the only contested issue for implied easement was whether the use was necessary for Cornwell’s beneficial enjoyment; Plaintiffs argued alternative access would be feasible but costly.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is there an express easement arising from mediation?	Cornwell contends mediation created an express easement; Plaintiffs deny claim.	Cornwell argues the mediation agreement grants an easement for ingress/egress.	Waived; mediation cannot establish an express easement.
Is there an easement by estoppel?	Plaintiffs would be bound by any estoppel arising from prior representations.	Cornwell asserts Plaintiffs relied on prior use and deed language to her detriment.	Not preserved; no trial evidence or pleadings supporting estoppel; affirmed denial.
Does an implied easement exist requiring strict necessity?	Cornwell must show necessity and cost-ineffectiveness of alternate access to qualify.	The current driveway is necessary due to cost and feasibility of alternatives.	No implied easement; evidence failed to prove reasonably necessary; affirmed trial court.
Does the deed’s “easements apparent upon inspection” limit Cornwell’s claim?	Douglas and Douglas-Plaintiffs argue no protection of such easement governs this driveway.	Cornwell contends the clause preserves her open/visible easement.	Limitation does not create or entitle easement; not applicable here.

Newman v. Woodard, 288 S.W.3d 862 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (implied easement elements; cost/necessity considerations)
Fowler v. Wilbanks, 48 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (necessity as reasonably necessary, not strict)
Rightsell v. Hale, 18 S.W. 245 (Tenn. 1891) (reasonableness of expenditure to replace access weighs on necessity)
LaRue v. Greene Cnty. Bank, 166 S.W.2d 1044 (Tenn. 1942) (concept of necessity in implied easements)
Cellco P’Ship v. Shelby Cnty., 172 S.W.3d 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (limits on implied easements and preservation of severed land interests)