Dwayne McGowan v. State, 07-15-00270-CR

Background

In 2008 McGowan pleaded guilty to injury to a disabled person and received deferred adjudication for 5 years with monetary obligations (fine, fees, costs, attorney fees).
In 2009 his deferred adjudication was revoked after plea of true to violations; he was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to 10 years, fined, and then (in 2010) shock-probation returned him to 5 years community supervision with the sentence suspended and additional monetary obligations ordered.
Subsequent modification (2013) increased attorney’s fees by $400. In 2015 the State moved to revoke solely for failure to pay specified monetary obligations (fines, fees, restitution, supervision fees, Crime Stoppers fee).
At the 2015 revocation hearing McGowan pled not true but his counsel stipulated the allegations were true while asserting indigence/ inability to pay as a defense; the State’s probation officer testified McGowan had prior employment and could earn about $360/month; McGowan testified he was unemployed, had limited resources, eviction, child‑support arrears, and no assets.
The trial court said the State did not prove ability to pay on some items but treated fines differently from restitution, considered the factors in art. 42.037(h), found revocation proper, reformed the sentence to 4 years, and revoked community supervision.
On appeal McGowan challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence to support revocation, (2) a judgment entry mischaracterizing his plea as “true” instead of “not true,” and (3) the judgment misstating the original suspended punishment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (McGowan)	Held
1. Sufficiency: Was revocation supported where alleged only failure to pay monetary obligations?	State: Proved nonpayment of court-ordered monetary obligations (including fine); at least one ground suffices for revocation.	McGowan: Trial found State failed to prove ability to pay; inability to pay is a defense under art. 42.12 §21(c) (and he argued art. 42.037(h) factors apply to restitution).	Held: Affirmed — revocation upheld because State proved nonpayment of a fine; fines are not subject to §21(c) ability-to-pay defense (Gipson).
2. Plea entry error: Judgment lists plea as “true” though record shows “not true.”	State: No contention that record was incorrect; focused on substance of revocation.	McGowan: Judgment inaccurately records plea as “true.”	Held: Sustained — court modified judgment to reflect plea as “Not True.”
3. Original punishment misstated in judgment.	State: No dispute about proper correction when record supports it.	McGowan: Judgment misstates original suspended sentence/fine; should reflect 10 years and $1,322.64 suspended for 5 years.	Held: Sustained — court modified judgment to state original punishment as 10 years TDCJ and $1,322.64 fine suspended for 5 years.

Key Cases Cited

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (standard of review for revocation is abuse of discretion)
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (preponderance standard in revocation)
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (State must prove violation by preponderance)
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (trial court abuses discretion if State fails on every ground)
Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (view evidence in light most favorable to revocation)
Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (one sufficient ground supports revocation)
Gipson v. State, 428 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (§21(c) ability-to-pay defense does not apply to fines)
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (appellate courts may reform judgments to reflect truth when record supports it)