DUVALL v. HUSTLER
2:18-cv-03278
| E.D. Pa. | Mar 19, 2020Background
- On Sept. 28, 2016, Christopher Sowell (32, with mental-health/substance history) attacked three minors at his home; police searched and later found him on the front porch of a friend’s nearby house.
- Nine Philadelphia officers fired 109 rounds at Sowell; 25 rounds struck him and he died. No firearm or other weapon was recovered; a broken cell phone was found under his body.
- Plaintiffs (Sowell’s mother and the children’s mother) sued the nine officers and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), state-law assault/battery and IIED, and Monell theories (failure to train, supervise, discipline). They also asserted Wrongful Death and Survival Act claims.
- Key disputed facts: officers uniformly testified they saw a muzzle flash and heard a gunshot; plaintiffs emphasize the undisputed absence of a gun and inconsistencies about whether officers compared stories en route to Internal Affairs.
- DOJ and Police IAO reports (pre-dating the shooting) criticized the PD’s practices: interviews not audio/video recorded, delay in interviewing involved officers, and limited issuance of tasers; those policies remained in place in 2016.
- Court disposition on summary judgment: denied summary judgment for officers on excessive-force/qualified-immunity and denied summary judgment on Monell failure-to-supervise/discipline; granted summary judgment for officers on state torts (assault, battery, IIED) and on plaintiffs’ failure-to-train/taser Monell claim (no causation). Wrongful Death/Survival claims survive as derivative of the §1983 claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force / Qualified immunity | Officers used objectively unreasonable deadly force; credibility disputes (no gun) create triable issues | Use of deadly force was reasonable because officers saw a gun, saw muzzle flash, and heard a shot | Denied summary judgment; viewing record for plaintiffs, factual disputes preclude granting qualified immunity and excessive-force claim proceeds to trial |
| Continued use/volume of gunfire | Officers continued firing after threat neutralized (109 shots; many hits to back and soles) | Wound placement explained by officer positions; firing stopped when threat dissipated | Denied summary judgment; genuine disputes about timing, bursts, and wounds create triable issues |
| Monell — failure to train / equip (tasers & optional CIT) | City deliberately indifferent by making crisis-intervention training optional and not issuing tasers department-wide | No causation: several shooters had taser/CIT yet still used firearms | Granted summary judgment to City on failure-to-train/taser theory (no evidence that policy was moving force of injury) |
| Monell — failure to supervise / discipline; investigatory practice | City maintained long-standing investigatory/practice deficiencies (no recorded interviews; delayed interviews) fostering culture of non‑accountability and facilitating falsified narratives | Timing/manner of interviews occurred after shooting and could not have caused the shooting | Denied summary judgment on failure-to-supervise/discipline; a jury could find deliberate indifference and causal contribution to constitutional violations |
| State-law torts & IIED; federal assault/battery | Officers committed assault, battery, IIED; Wrongful Death/Survival claims | PSTCA bars tort claims absent willful misconduct; federal assault/battery duplicates §1983 | Summary judgment for officers on state assault, battery, IIED and on federal assault/battery (duplicative). Wrongful Death and Survival Act claims survive as derivative of viable §1983 claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (establishes the two-step qualified immunity framework)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (courts may exercise discretion in the order of qualified-immunity prongs)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force permissible only to prevent escape when suspect poses significant threat)
- Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177 (3d Cir.) (officers may be liable for continuing to fire after threat has vanished)
- Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir.) (denying summary judgment where excessive force claim raised by nonfleeing, outnumbered suspect)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (municipal liability for failure to train requires deliberate indifference)