Dustin Trowbridge v. Indiana Department of Correcti, 20-3314

Indiana Department of Correction policy forbids prisoners from possessing personal photographs showing exposed genitalia; an intimate photo from Trowbridge’s fiancée was intercepted and deleted by mailroom staff.
Trowbridge sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; some claims survived screening and the court set discovery deadlines and a motion-to-compel procedure.
He requested discovery about the policy’s drafters, review process, and pre-/post-policy rates of violence/harassment; defendants said much was unavailable or burdensome and only confirmed annual review.
Andy Dunigan (Director of Policy and Accreditation) signed a discovery response but was not named in initial disclosures; he later filed a declaration supporting the policy; Trowbridge did not move to compel further discovery or request more time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants relying on Dunigan’s declaration and Payton v. Cannon; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding the policy was rationally related to legitimate penological interests and any disclosure error was harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dunigan’s declaration should be stricken as an undisclosed witness	Dunigan wasn’t in initial disclosures; declaration should be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1)	Disclosures warned witnesses could be identified in discovery responses; Dunigan signed a discovery response; no prejudice shown	Any disclosure error was harmless; exclusion would not change the record; affirmed
Whether cited social‑science articles create a genuine factual dispute about the policy’s rationality	Articles undermine causal link between pornography and staff harassment/violence, creating a dispute	Articles do not address non‑violent staff harassment in prisons or the specific penological concerns at issue	Articles insufficient to create a reasonable factual dispute; policy remains rationally related to legitimate interests
Whether prison officials must produce empirical data rather than relying on professional judgment	Officials must justify policies with data, not broad assertions	Professional judgments about inmate behavior and safety warrant judicial deference; burden is on prisoner to disprove the regulation	Courts defer to professional judgment in this context; defendants met their burden at summary judgment

Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2015) (upheld similar prison ban; used as controlling precedent)
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (U.S. 1987) (framework for evaluating prison regulations that impinge on constitutional rights)
Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing disputed facts from matters of professional judgment)
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (U.S. 2003) (burden on prisoner to disprove validity of prison regulations)
David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2003) (harmless‑error analysis for discovery/sanctions issues)
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (U.S. 2006) (deference to prison administrators' professional judgments)