Dustin Blythe v. State of Indiana
14 N.E.3d 823
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Blythe was charged with nine counts of forgery (Counts I–IX) and one count of falsely making a petition of nomination (Count X) for allegedly falsifying signatures on presidential ballot petitions.
- The original information alleged Blythe “uttered” forged instruments; after the State rested the court allowed amendment to “make or utter.”
- Defense repeatedly argued before and during trial that proof of “uttering” (e.g., presenting or delivering a forged instrument) was lacking and that the case focused on whether Blythe actually wrote (made) the signatures.
- The State presented testimony that signatures of nine individuals were not genuine, that county party workers copied names/signatures across petitions under the direction of a co-defendant, and expert handwriting testimony linking Blythe to some entries.
- Jury convicted Blythe on all counts. At sentencing Blythe moved to vacate Counts II–IX (arguing a single forgery act) and Count X (arguing it was a lesser-included offense of the forgeries). Court sentenced and suspended sentences; appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Blythe) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether amendment of the information (adding "make") after the State rested was permissible | Amendment was form only; the gravamen (forging petitions) was unchanged and defense suffered no prejudice | Amendment changed the theory mid-trial and prejudiced Blythe’s substantial rights and plea decisions | Court: Amendment was permissible as form; no substantial-rights prejudice affirmed |
| 2. Whether trial court erred denying motion for judgment on Counts I–IX when State had only proved "making" not "uttering" | Evidence that Blythe made (copied/placed) signatures supported "make or utter" forgery theory presented to jury | Defense argued there was no evidence of "uttering" (presenting/delivering/using) as charged originally | Court: Because amendment was allowed, motion denied (no separate ruling required on "uttering") |
| 3. Whether separate convictions for Counts II–IX were permitted or whether they constituted a single act of forgery | Each falsified signature was charged as a separate count; State maintained distinct offenses tied to different victims | The acts were part of a single, continuous scheme with one intent to defraud and thus support only one forgery conviction | Court: Multiple convictions (Counts II–IX) vacated; the conduct constituted a single act of forgery for sentencing purposes |
| 4. Whether Count X (falsely making petition of nomination) is a lesser-included/factual duplicate of forgery counts | State conceded Count X relied on the same act/evidence as one of the forgery counts | Count X duplicates proof of a forgery count and should be vacated | Court: Count X vacated (State did not contest) |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiseman v. State, 521 N.E.2d 942 (Ind. 1988) (multiple similar instruments presented together may constitute a single forgery)
- McIntyre v. State, 717 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. 1999) (amendment is form, not substance, if defense and evidence apply equally after amendment)
- Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (standards governing whether an amendment is substantive and effect on defenses)
- Jordan v. State, 502 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 1987) (distinguishing "making" and "uttering" in forgery jurisprudence)
- Stroup v. State, 810 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (discussion of "uttering" versus other statutory terms in forgery context)