Durham v. Jenkins
735 S.E.2d 266
W. Va.2012Background
- Durhams appeal a circuit-court order denying dismissal of a §19-20-20 dog-killing action; Jenkinses sued for destruction of the Durhams’ Rottweiler mix alleging viciousness/dangerousness; circuit court ordered destruction and stayed the order for appeal; court holds §19-20-20 does not authorize a civil suit and is criminal in nature; majority vacates order; incident involved Felicity Jenkins suffering serious injuries from a dog attack at a party; Durhams euthanized their Great Dane after attack; the attack prompted the civil proceeding and resulting dispute over authority to order euthanization; the incident raised concerns about public safety and policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §19-20-20 creates a private action to destroy a dog | Durhams: no private remedy implied | Jenkinses: statute permits private action to seek destruction | No private action implied; statute is criminal in nature |
| Whether the second sentence of §19-20-20 alters the standard of proof | Implied to be beyond a reasonable doubt | No single standard; unity of section | Both sentences read together as criminal; standard is beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime |
| Whether allowing a private action is consistent with the legislative scheme | Private action furthers public-safety goals | Private action not contemplated by statute | Not consistent; no private action permitted by statute |
| Whether §19-20-20 proceedings must be tied to a criminal prosecution | Destruction may be sought independently of a conviction | Destruction follows from criminal finding | Destruction authority stems from criminal proceeding; private action not allowed |
| Whether Jenkinses have standing to seek judicial destruction of the dog | Standing proper to seek relief under statute | Standing improperly framed; not addressed by majority | Standing not reached by majority; analysis unnecessary to hold |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 164 W.Va. 268, 262 S.E.2d 757 (1980) (1980) (four-factor test for implied private action; factors relevant, not mandatory)
- Hill v. Stowers, 224 W.Va. 51, 680 S.E.2d 66 (2009) (2009) (confirms Hurley framework; factors considered)
- Molisee, 180 W.Va. 551, 378 S.E.2d 100 (1989) (1989) (statutory context for criminal nature of §19-20-19/20)
- State ex rel. Holbert v. Robinson, 134 W.Va. 524, 59 S.E.2d 884 (1950) (1950) (strong unity-of-the-whole statute interpretive principle)
- Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002) (2002) (standing framework plural elements)
- Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975) (1975) (implied private action not automatically assumed)
- Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979) (1979) (legislative history not required to imply private remedy)
- Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77, 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990) (1990) (private remedy may exist despite criminal statute)