191 F. Supp. 3d 429
M.D. Pa.2016Background
- Jackie Durden applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (DIB) with an amended onset date of August 26, 2011 and date last insured December 31, 2012; ALJ denied benefits and Appeals Council affirmed; Durden appealed to district court.
- Medical record: diagnosed PTSD and major depression treated at VA and community clinics; VA awarded a 70% service-connection rating for PTSD; treatment notes showed exacerbation after the death of the child’s father in early 2012 but overall stabilization with medication and therapy.
- Examining and treating providers (Dr. Stephens, Dr. Johnson, Ms. Acker) assigned GAF scores largely in the 40–50 range and offered opinions about significant occupational impairment; a state consultative reviewer (Dr. Fretz) found no severe dysfunction and concluded claimant could perform ADLs and work-related tasks.
- Plaintiff reported functional limitations (limited walking, poor sleep from nocturia, medication side effects, intermittent vertigo/colitis) but treatment notes repeatedly documented intact attention/concentration, appropriate grooming, gym attendance, and ability to care for her child.
- ALJ assessed an RFC for light work with specific break/restroom allowances, limited public interaction, occasional postural limits, and numerous environmental restrictions; ALJ found claimant not disabled at step 4 (could perform past relevant work) and step 5 (other jobs available). Magistrate judge recommended affirmance; district judge adopted report and recommendation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credibility of Durden’s subjective symptom statements | Durden contends ALJ improperly discredited her reports (e.g., caring for child, ADLs, and unemployment inconsistencies do not justify adverse credibility findings) | ALJ permissibly relied on medical evidence of stabilization, inconsistencies between reports and records, conservative treatment, and receipt of unemployment | Court: ALJ’s credibility findings supported by substantial evidence; any error (e.g., childcare inference) harmless under the record |
| Weight given to VA 70% disability rating | Durden argues ALJ should have developed record for VA rating and given more weight to 70% rating | Commissioner: VA ratings use different standards and non‑SSA adjudicators; ALJ considered rating and reasonably afforded it little weight given record inconsistencies | Court: ALJ properly considered and explained weight to VA rating; difference in standards and medical record support giving it little weight |
| Weight to medical opinions and RFC formulation | Durden asserts ALJ gave little/partial weight to most opinions and effectively relied on her own lay judgment | ALJ credited parts of opinions, relied on detailed state consultative review (Dr. Fretz) and treatment notes to craft RFC between competing opinions | Court: ALJ may credit portions of opinions and substantial evidence supports RFC closer to Dr. Fretz; assigning partial weight was proper |
| Mental limitations (concentration, persistence, pace) and VE hypothetical | Durden asserts ALJ failed to include specific limitations for concentration/pace in RFC/hypothetical | ALJ found only moderate limitation and accounted for it with increased breaks and task restrictions; VE jobs identified were unskilled/simple | Court: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s approach; omission of additional specific pace limits not reversible because record did not clearly require them and VE jobs were compatible |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1988) (substantial‑evidence standard for reviewing Social Security decisions)
- Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (application of substantial‑evidence review)
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (U.S. 1988) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 2004) (deferential substantial‑evidence review)
- Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 1999) (Social Security five‑step framework)
- Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir. 1986) (substantial evidence standard description)
- Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 1999) (review of ALJ factual findings)
- Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004) (requirements for hypothetical/Vocational Expert re: concentration, persistence, pace)
- Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (U.S. 2000) (ALJ duty to develop record)
- Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (U.S. 2009) (VA’s pro‑claimant adjudicatory posture and duties)