Dunning v. Ware
253 F. Supp. 3d 290
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Leonard Dunning (plaintiff), an older CSOSA Offender Processing Specialist, applied for a Supervisory Offender Processing Specialist vacancy but scored 19/60 on the interview and was not selected.
- The panel ranked candidates; Damian Campbell-Adams (younger) scored highest and was selected.
- Dunning sued alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII (failure to promote) and earlier had pleaded retaliation claims that were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
- Defendant Ware (CSOSA Director) moved for summary judgment, asserting the panel selected the highest-scoring candidate for non-discriminatory reasons (supervisory experience and stronger interview).
- Dunning conceded he lacked supervisory experience, was not present for other interviews, and presented no direct evidence that panelists knew his age or that selection was pretextual; he sought additional discovery under Rule 56(d) but the court found he failed to justify delay.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding no genuine dispute that the hiring decision was non-discriminatory and that plaintiff produced insufficient evidence of pretext or knowledge of his age by decisionmakers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CSOSA engaged in age discrimination in failing to promote Dunning | Dunning contends non-selection was motivated by age (and that a younger candidate was preselected) | Agency says panel selected highest-scoring, more-qualified candidate based on interview and supervisory experience | Court held no; plaintiff failed to show pretext or that decisionmakers knew his age |
| Whether plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment | Dunning pointed to disparate outcome and sought discovery to support preselection claim | Ware proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (ranking/interview results); no evidence contradicts it | Court held plaintiff’s speculative assertions insufficient; summary judgment appropriate |
| Whether Rule 56(d) discovery should be allowed to pursue evidence of preselection (e.g., depositions) | Dunning sought to depose witnesses (Perkins, others) to support claim and argued lack of facts | Defendant argued discovery period was ample and plaintiff failed to justify omission of depositions earlier | Court denied continuance/56(d) relief because plaintiff did not identify facts to be revealed or justify why discovery wasn’t done earlier |
| Whether defendant (Ware) had requisite knowledge of plaintiff’s age to be liable | Plaintiff did not allege or show that panel members or director knew his age; plaintiff conceded panelists unaware | Defendant emphasized panelists’ affidavits that they did not know Dunning’s age and relied on panel rankings | Court held absence of knowledge undermines discrimination claim; age could not have been the motivating factor |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard and movant burden)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment and genuine issue standard)
- Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (employer's production burden and plaintiff's burden to prove pretext)
- Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (assessing pretext at summary judgment without resolving prima facie case)
- Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 715 F.3d 354 (age-discrimination claims analyzed like Title VII claims)