Dunne v. Coan, 684 F. App'x 85

Debtor Sean Dunne filed Chapter 7; his wife Gayle Killilea Dunne objected when the Chapter 7 Trustee sought relief from the automatic stay to allow litigation in Ireland (the "OA litigation") to proceed against her.
The bankruptcy court granted the Trustee’s motion for relief from the automatic stay nunc pro tunc and ruled Killilea lacked standing to challenge the Trustee’s motion.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of relief from the stay but did not decide Killilea’s standing.
Killilea appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing she has standing to challenge the bankruptcy court’s order and that the stay-lift order was an abuse of discretion.
The Second Circuit reviewed standing de novo and evaluated whether Killilea showed the required "person aggrieved" (direct, pecuniary) interest to pursue a bankruptcy appeal.
The court concluded Killilea is neither a creditor nor a co-debtor, asserted no direct pecuniary interest in the bankruptcy estate, and any future financial harm from resumed Irish litigation was speculative and not directly caused by the stay order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Killilea has appellate standing to challenge the bankruptcy court’s order lifting the automatic stay	Killilea argued she was injured by lifting the stay and therefore can appeal	Trustee argued Killilea lacks "person aggrieved" status because she has no direct pecuniary interest in the bankruptcy estate	Killilea lacks bankruptcy appellate standing; appeal dismissed
Whether lifting the automatic stay was an abuse of discretion	Killilea contended the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting relief nunc pro tunc	Trustee maintained relief was proper to allow the Irish litigation to proceed	Court did not reach merits after resolving lack of standing

In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 761 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2014) (standing reviewed de novo)
In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (articulating "person aggrieved" requirement for bankruptcy appeals)
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining appellate standing is more exacting than Article III standing)
In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013) (speculative or potential harm inadequate for appellate standing)
In re AMR Corp., 730 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (purpose of automatic stay is to protect debtor and preserve estate for creditors)
In re Refco, Inc., 505 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (only debtor or creditors generally have party-in-interest standing to seek stay relief)
In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1983) (standing limits on who may request relief from automatic stay)