Duncan v. Brickman, 2D16-4251

Parties: David Duncan (father/appellant) and Thalia Tatham Brickman (mother/appellee) in a paternity/parenting dispute concerning their minor child, A.L.D., dating back to 2006.
A temporary timesharing order (2008) gave Duncan majority parenting time; final determination was repeatedly delayed and hearings spanned 2010–2013.
Brickman filed multiple contempt motions (2011–2012) alleging Duncan violated the temporary timesharing order; contempt evidentiary hearings concluded in 2013.
The trial court did not issue a contempt ruling until June 2016 (three years after the hearings), finding Duncan in contempt and modifying timesharing to equal 50/50 as a sanction for contempt.
In August 2016 the court entered a final paternity order based on a 2011 magistrate report recommending majority timesharing for Duncan; the court then "clarified" that the contempt-based timesharing provisions controlled, creating inconsistent orders.
Appellate posture: Duncan appeals the contempt order and the clarified final order; the appellate court reverses.

Issue	Duncan's Argument	Brickman's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court may modify timesharing as a sanction for contempt	Prohibited — modifying custody as punishment is improper and harms the child	Court acted within discretion to sanction contempt by reducing Duncan's time	Court held modification of timesharing as a contempt sanction is improper and reversed
Whether the three-year delay between evidentiary hearings and contempt ruling warrants reversal	Delay undermines reliability of ruling; court abused discretion by waiting	Court's delay not addressed as justified; contends order stands	Court held the three-year delay was an abuse of discretion and required reversal of the contempt order
What parenting plan/timesharing is operative pending remand	Duncan: contempt-based modification invalid; prior final paternity order (not appealed) remains	Brickman: contempt order should control; court attempted to clarify control in favor of contempt order	Appellate court reversed contempt order and remanded; did not fashion a new parenting plan and encouraged prompt case management on remand

LaLoggia-VonHegel v. VonHegel, 732 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (changing custody as contempt sanction penalizes children and is improper absent best-interest findings)
Hunter v. Hunter, 65 So. 3d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (trial court may not modify timesharing as contempt sanction)
Simpson v. Young, 884 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (reiterating prohibition on custody change as contempt punishment)
Pelliccia v. Arce, 867 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (same principle regarding contempt and custody modification)
Brooks v. Brooks, 164 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (standard of review: contempt findings in family law generally reviewed for abuse of discretion)
McCartney v. McCartney, 725 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (judicial delays cause anxiety, expense, and undermine confidence in the system)
Schang v. Schang, 53 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (trial courts must render decisions promptly and seriously consider family-law matters)
Falabella v. Wilkins, 656 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (prompt rulings required in family law)
Ritter v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 700 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (criticizing excessive judicial delay)
Cockrell v. Kinnett, 177 So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (noting timesharing modification during contempt permissible only with proof of substantial change and best-interest findings)
Campbell v. Campbell, 100 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (same caveat when modifying timesharing in contempt proceedings)