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366 F. Supp. 3d 1131
S.D. Cal.
2019
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Background

  • Plaintiffs challenged California Penal Code § 32310 (ban on acquiring/possessing detachable magazines that accept >10 rounds, with dispossession requirements) as violating the Second Amendment and as an uncompensated taking.
  • The statute (amended by Prop. 63) criminalizes acquisition/import/manufacture and makes possession an infraction/misdemeanor, with options to remove, sell to a dealer, or surrender for destruction.
  • The record included state crime statistics, expert reports, and compilations of mass-shooting incidents (e.g., Mother Jones, Mayors/Everytown), which the court found of limited evidentiary weight.
  • Plaintiffs argued magazines >10 rounds are common, used for lawful self-defense, and therefore protected under Heller; they also argued the dispossession/forfeiture provisions effect a taking without compensation.
  • The State argued historical regulation and public-safety interests (mass-shooting prevention, critical pause, protecting police/public) justify the ban and that intermediate (not strict) scrutiny should apply.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether magazines >10 rounds are protected "arms" under the Second Amendment Magazines are necessary components of commonly owned firearms used for lawful self-defense; thus protected under Heller's common-use test State claimed public-safety exception/historical regulation removes protection Court: Magazines >10 rounds are "arms" in common use and protected; §32310 fails Heller
Whether historical tradition places magazine-capacity limits outside Second Amendment protection No longstanding tradition of capacity limits; modern capacity limits are recent and not longstanding State pointed to early-20th-century firing-capacity and machine-gun statutes as historical precedent Court: Historical record does not show longstanding prohibition of detachable magazine capacity at 10 rounds; historical exception fails
Appropriate level of scrutiny and fit of statute to State interests Complete ban targets core right (self-defense in home) and is severe burden → strict scrutiny; §32310 is not narrowly tailored State: intermediate scrutiny applies; legislature/ballot measure entitled to deference; reasonable fit based on mass-shooting data and experts Court: statute targets core right and imposes severe burden → strict scrutiny warranted; fails strict scrutiny; also fails intermediate scrutiny (not a reasonable fit)
Adequacy/weight of State's empirical evidence (mass-shooting data) N/A (plaintiffs attacked evidence reliability) State relied on studies, expert reports, and compilations to show LCMs increase lethality and that bans reduce harm Court: State evidence (news compilations, unsworn reports) is thin, often inadmissible or non-persuasive; does not show reasonable fit
Whether dispossession/surrender provisions effect an uncompensated taking Forcible surrender or compelled removal/sale is a physical appropriation (deprivation of possession) requiring compensation State asserted exercise of police power and nuisance characterization allows dispossession without compensation Court: dispossession provision forces surrender/destruction → constitutes a physical taking (per se appropriation) and cannot be enforced without compensation
Scope of injunction/remedy N/A N/A Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, declared §32310 unconstitutional in its entirety, enjoined enforcement, and required notice to law enforcement

Key Cases Cited

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess commonly used arms for self-defense in the home)
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporated against the states)
  • Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) (historical/textual approach to scope of Second Amendment)
  • Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014) (analysis of presumptively lawful regulations and core burdens)
  • Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015) (magazine-capacity regulation may implicate core right; level-of-scrutiny analysis in preliminary-injunction context)
  • Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (a weapon may not be banned simply because it is dangerous; ‘‘dangerous and unusual’’ test)
  • Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (takings analysis: categorical and multi-factor approaches to regulatory takings)
  • Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent physical occupation constitutes a per se taking)
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Case Details

Case Name: Duncan v. Becerra
Court Name: District Court, S.D. California
Date Published: Mar 29, 2019
Citations: 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131; Case No.: 3:17cv1017-BEN (JLB)
Docket Number: Case No.: 3:17cv1017-BEN (JLB)
Court Abbreviation: S.D. Cal.
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    Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131