Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. the Zoning Board of Adjustment
154 A.3d 710
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2017Background
- Dunbar Homes owned an existing 276-unit garden-apartment complex and 6.93 adjacent acres in Franklin Township (GB zone) and sought approval to add 55 apartments.
- Under the Ordinance in effect when Dunbar submitted materials (July 15, 2013) garden apartments were a conditional use but only on parcels of 10+ acres, so Dunbar needed a N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) variance for its <10-acre site.
- The Township amended its zoning ordinance effective August 5, 2013, eliminating garden apartments as a conditional use in the GB zone, which would force Dunbar to seek a (d)(1) variance instead.
- Dunbar filed a multi-document submission on July 15, 2013; the Township zoning officer identified specific missing items and fees and later determined the submission did not constitute an “application for development” until October 29, 2013.
- The Zoning Board upheld the officer; the trial court reversed, finding the submission triggered the "time of application" statute (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5) on July 15; the Appellate Division reversed the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the "time of application" statute (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5) trigger? | Dunbar: any substantial, bona fide submission that gives notice and understanding of the proposal triggers protection; completeness not required. | Township: statute applies only when the application is "complete." | The MLUL definition controls: the trigger is the "submission of an application for development," meaning the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance. Completeness per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3 is a separate concept. |
| May a municipality redefine "application for development" to require completeness in its ordinance? | Dunbar: ordinance cannot override the MLUL definition; municipal completeness requirement is invalid to limit statutory protection. | Township: local ordinance may set its own definition and require completeness. | MLUL definitions are mandatory here; an ordinance may not alter N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 to defeat the statewide uniformity goal. The Franklin ordinance must be read to incorporate both MLUL meanings separately. |
| What standard determines whether a submission is an "application for development" for the statute? | Dunbar/trial court: a submission is protected if it supplies enough information to commence a meaningful review (even if not formally "complete"). | Township: the submission must include all documents that the local ordinance specifically requires for the type of approval sought. | The court rejects the vague "meaningful review" test and holds the MLUL definition controls: the submission must include the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance for that approval. Missing ordinance-required items mean no protection. |
| Was the Board’s determination (that Dunbar’s July submission lacked required documents) arbitrary or unreasonable? | Dunbar: Board acted unreasonably; trial court correctly reversed. | Township: Board reasonably found required ordinance items missing; time-of-application protection therefore did not apply. | The Appellate Division finds the Board’s determination not arbitrary or unreasonable because Dunbar’s July submission omitted documents and fees specifically required by the Ordinance; reversal of the Board by the trial court was therefore in error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning/Zoning Bd. of S. Toms River, 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div.) (discussing shift from "time of decision" to "time of application" rule)
- Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of the Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) (municipality may amend ordinance during pendency under prior time-of-decision rule)
- Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338 (2003) (interpretation of MLUL definitions and municipal authority)
- Allied Realty v. Upper Saddle River, 221 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div.) (purpose of completeness/deemed complete rules and time limits)
- Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) (standard for setting aside zoning board action: arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable)
- Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95 (2011) (municipal zoning power must conform to MLUL delegation)
- Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191 (2001) (appellate review focuses on judgments, not trial court reasoning)