Dumont v. Reily Foods Company, 1:18-cv-10907

Plaintiff Kathy Dumont sent a July 28, 2017 ch. 93A demand letter alleging New England Coffee’s flavored coffees were mislabeled (e.g., “Hazelnut Crème” contains no hazelnut) and sought refunds for herself and a nationwide putative class.
The demand letter emphasized alleged regulatory and labeling violations and requested "a refund of monies" for purchases over the prior four years.
Defendant responded offering to reimburse purchasers who submitted proof of purchase and returned unused product and noted the demand letter lacked detail about any physical injury or financial loss; plaintiff acknowledged receipt but did not provide further proof.
The First Circuit previously reversed this court’s dismissal of the Chapter 93A claim; the only remaining claim at summary judgment was Count I under ch. 93A.
Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the demand letter failed to identify a cognizable injury (it did not state dissatisfaction, overpayment, or that Dumont would have paid less had she known the contents).
The district court denied summary judgment: it held the demand letter reasonably put defendants on notice of an economic injury (refund), but barred plaintiff from pursuing a separate premium-price theory because the demand letter did not allege she paid a premium or would have paid less.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dumont's demand letter satisfied ch. 93A § 9(3) by identifying the injury suffered	Dumont's request for "a refund of monies" adequately described an economic injury and put defendants on notice	The letter lacked specifics: did not state dissatisfaction, overpayment, or that she would not have purchased but for the alleged mislabeling; therefore insufficient	Demand letter was sufficient to show an economic injury (refund); summary judgment denied on that basis
Whether Dumont can pursue a premium-price theory of damages (i.e., she paid more because of false advertising)	Dumont sought class-wide refunds and sought monetary relief generally	Defendants argue they could not assess or settle a premium-price claim because the demand letter never alleged payment of a premium or causation	Court precluded the premium-price theory because the demand letter did not allege she paid a premium or would have paid less; plaintiff may not proceed on that theory

Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 934 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2019) (First Circuit reversed dismissal of the Chapter 93A claim)
Richards v. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L., 850 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 2006) (statute should not be read for technicalities; demand letter sufficiency judged by notice)
Moynihan v. LifeCare Centers of Am., Inc., 798 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 2003) (adequate demand letter must recite facts making cause and extent of injury reasonably apparent)
Fredericks v. Rosenblatt, 667 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1996) (demand-letter sufficiency standard)
Thorpe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1993) (demand letter inadequate where defendant could not appraise claim value or frame a settlement offer)