341 F. Supp. 3d 706
E.D. Mich.2018Background
- Plaintiffs are prospective same-sex adoptive/foster parents (the Dumonts and the Busk-Suttons) and a taxpayer plaintiff (Ludolph) who allege they were turned away by state‑contracted, faith‑based child‑placing agencies that use religious criteria to refuse same‑sex applicants.
- Michigan DHHS contracts with over 100 private child‑placing agencies to provide foster/adoption services and incorporates a non‑discrimination clause in contracts, but Plaintiffs allege DHHS permits agencies to rely on PA 53 (2015) religious‑belief exemptions that allow refusals.
- Plaintiffs challenge the State’s practice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Establishment Clause (government endorsement of religion) and Equal Protection Clause (discrimination based on sexual orientation) violations and seek declaratory and injunctive relief restraining contracts or funding to agencies that exclude same‑sex couples.
- Defendants include DHHS officials (Lyon, McCall) and intervenors (St. Vincent and other faith‑based agencies); motions to dismiss were filed; the court held oral argument and evaluated standing and merits at the 12(b)(1)/(6) stage.
- The court accepted Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true for pleading purposes and denied dismissal as to the prospective parent plaintiffs’ Establishment and Equal Protection claims, but dismissed Ludolph’s taxpayer‑standing claims for lack of standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing of prospective parents to bring Establishment and Equal Protection claims | Turned away by state‑contracted agencies; allege stigmatic and practical injury making adoption harder; harm traceable to State contracts; relief would redress injury | Defendants say private agencies, not State, refused applicants; alleged injuries not fairly traceable or redressable; plaintiffs lack fundamental right to adopt | Court: Prospective parent plaintiffs have alleged sufficient injury‑in‑fact, traceability, and redressability at pleading stage; standing upheld |
| Taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause (Ludolph) | Taxpayer challenges use of taxpayer funds to subsidize religion via contracts supporting discriminatory, religious criteria | Defendants: challenge concerns executive contracting practice, not a specific legislative appropriation authorizing religious expenditures; Flast not satisfied | Court: Taxpayer standing not established because Plaintiffs failed to identify an express legislative appropriation authorizing religious expenditure; Ludolph’s claims dismissed with prejudice |
| Establishment Clause: does State’s contracting practice endorse religion or excessively entangle church and state? | PA 53 and DHHS contracts effectively enable faith‑based agencies to exclude same‑sex couples, conveying government endorsement of religious views and delegating core state functions to religious actors | Defendants point to secular purpose (maximize placement options), Amos and accommodation precedents, and deny endorsement/entanglement | Court: Under Lemon/endorsement/entanglement framework (and Smith), Plaintiffs plausibly allege that State practice conveys endorsement of religion and risks excessive entanglement; claim survives pleading stage |
| Equal Protection: is permitting religious exclusions rationally related to a legitimate state interest or motivated by anti‑gay animus? | PA 53 allegedly enacted to appease religious actors and permits discrimination that worsens placement shortages; challengers claim animus and irrationality | Defendants assert a legitimate rational basis: keep as many providers as possible to serve children; deferential rational‑basis review applies | Court: Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts suggesting irrationality/animus sufficient to proceed to discovery under rational‑basis standard; claim survives pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements for injury, causation, redressability)
- Parsons v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 801 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.) (traceability and standing in third‑party conduct context)
- Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (taxpayer standing Flast two‑part nexus test)
- Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (executive‑branch expenditures and limits on Flast)
- Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (tax credit/Flast narrowness)
- Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (Lemon test for Establishment Clause)
- Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (historical‑practice approach; legislative prayer context)
- Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (accommodation and religious‑organization exemptions)
- Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (delegation of governmental power to religious bodies implicates Establishment Clause)
- Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (impermissible delegation/fusion of government and religion)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (state action tests when private conduct is at issue)
- Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (limitations on standing where causal link speculative)
- City of Jacksonville v. North Fla. Chapter, Ass'n Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. 656 (barrier to benefit theory for standing)
- Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (no fundamental right to be foster/adoptive parent for substantive due process)