Duke Grider v. B. Bowling, 785 F.3d 1248

Griders sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Missouri law alleging excessive force, unlawful arrest, and seizure by Springfield Police; district court denied partial summary judgment and denied in part, granted in part, with remaining excessive-force claim against Bowling and Reece and state-law assault claim against Bowling and Reece.
Bowling forcibly removed Grider from his vehicle, placed him on the ground with a knee on his back, and handcuffed him despite Grider’s refusal to exit and possession of a knife.
Reece arrived and kicked Grider in the head without prior communication or intervention by Bowling; Grider sustained facial contusions and neck pain.
Dougherty arrived after the kick; whiskey in Grider’s open bottle was poured out at the scene; Griders alleged Fourth Amendment violations and state-law claims.
The district court denied the Griders’ partial summary judgment and Bowling sought qualified-immunity relief; the court concluded Bowling was not clearly entitled to immunity as to the excessive-force claim, which the Eighth Circuit now reviews de novo.
The Court holds Bowling is entitled to qualified immunity; the alleged harms were not a clearly established violation given the facts viewed in Grider’s favor.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bowling’s conduct was excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.	Grider contends Bowling used excessive force in removing him from the vehicle.	Bowling argues force used was reasonable under the circumstances, especially given Grider’s knife and resistance.	Bowling did not use excessive force; no injury supports a violation under the circumstances.
Whether Bowling is liable for Reece’s kick in Grider’s head.	Bowling is liable for Reece’s kick as a shared responsibility.	Bowling was not involved in Reece’s actions and cannot be liable for another officer’s use of force.	Bowling not liable for Reece’s kick; liability requires personal involvement.
Whether Bowling can be liable for nonfeasance for failing to intervene.	Bowling should have intervened to prevent the unconstitutional act.	There is no evidence Bowling knew of the kick or had opportunity to intervene.	Bowling cannot be liable for nonfeasance; lacking awareness/opportunity to intervene.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (clearly established rights required for qualified immunity)
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (reasonableness of force and injury relevance in Eighth Circuit)
Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2004) (summary-judgment standard and factual view in light most favorable to nonmovant)
Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2008) (qualified-immunity framework after denial of summary judgment)
Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2009) (intervention liability for officers who fail to prevent excessive force)
Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009) (nonfeasance liability requires awareness and opportunity to intervene)
Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (individual liability for own use of excessive force)
Smith v. Kan. City, Mo. Police Dep't, 586 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2009) (individual liability for excessive force independent of others' actions)
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (as above for excessive-force standard)