Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts., 22 EAP 2016

Background

Decedent Elise DuBose received care at Willowcrest; Administrator Robert DuBose sued nursing home and health system for medical professional negligence after her death.
Trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs; Superior Court affirmed; case reached Pennsylvania Supreme Court with appellants (Willowcrest/Albert Einstein) challenging timing of suit.
Central statutory provision: MCARE Act § 513, labeled "Statute of repose," which generally bars medical professional liability claims commenced more than seven years after the alleged tort and contains subsection (d) addressing death/survival actions (claims "must be commenced within two years after the death").
Majority read § 513(a) as a seven-year statute of repose and § 513(d) as creating a two-year statute of limitations for survival/wrongful-death claims tied to the date of death.
Justice Baer (concurring in result, dissenting in part) argues § 513(d) should be read consistent with established survival-action law: a survival action is derivative of the decedent’s accrued cause of action and accrual/datelines are governed by when the decedent discovered (or reasonably should have discovered) the injury, with death as the latest accrual point.
Baer would affirm the judgment on alternative grounds: the discovery rule tolled accrual until the decedent’s death because her condition prevented discovery while alive, making the survival action timely filed within two years after death.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 513(d) changes accrual timing for survival medical-malpractice claims	§513(d) merely codifies existing law; survival actions accrue when plaintiff discovered injury or at death if undiscoverable	§513(d) creates a new accrual rule tying the two-year survival period to date of death, extending filing time for representatives	Majority: §513(d) ties the two-year period to death (affecting accrual); Baer (dissent in part): §513(d) should be read as consistent with preexisting accrual law and not to expand rights beyond the decedent’s own claim
Whether § 513 is a statute of repose and how that affects § 513(d)	§513 is a statute of repose; §513(d) should not be read to expand filing windows within a statute of repose	Defendants emphasize the repose character; majority treats (a) as repose but treats (d) as a limitations rule modifying accrual	Court: (a) is a statute of repose; majority treats (d) separately as a limitations rule tied to death; Baer disagrees and views (d) as consistent with repose and existing law
Whether the plaintiff’s action was timely under the discovery rule	Discovery rule tolled accrual until decedent’s death due to her incapacity; suit filed within two years after death	Defendants contend suit is untimely if accrual is measured earlier	Baer and trial court: action timely under discovery rule; Baer would affirm on that alternative ground
Whether § 513(d) improperly revives expired claims when death occurs after the limitations period expired	Plaintiff: §513(d) does not revive expired claims; survival action remains derivative	Majority’s interpretation can allow a representative to sue after the decedent’s claim expired, effectively extending the filing window	Baer: majority’s reading unjustifiably revives expired claims and departs from precedent; he rejects that result

Key Cases Cited

Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1987) (survival action accrues when decedent reasonably should have discovered injury; death is latest accrual point)
Anthony v. Koppers Co., 436 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981) (plurality) (survival statute does not create new cause of action; personal representative enforces decedent’s accrued claim)
Pezzulli v. D’Ambrosia, 26 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1942) (survival statute permits enforcement of causes of action that accrued before death)
Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 39 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2012) (context on MCARE Act legislative purpose concerning medical malpractice reform)