Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts.
173 A.3d 634
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Decedent Elise Dubose suffered severe injuries and developed multiple pressure ulcers while in hospital and nursing-home care between 2005–2007 and died of sepsis on October 18, 2007.
- Her estate (Robert Dubose, administrator) filed survival and wrongful-death medical‐malpractice suits in 2009; actions were consolidated, tried, and resulted in jury verdicts for plaintiff; defendants sought JNOV on survival claim as time‑barred.
- Defendants argued the survival claim accrued when the decedent was injured (2005/2007) so the two‑year personal‑injury limitations expired before the 2009 filings; they contended 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d) is a statute of repose and does not “reset” accrual at death.
- Plaintiff argued MCARE § 1303.513(d) plainly provides a two‑year limitation measured from death for wrongful‑death and survival claims, and alternatively invoked the discovery rule given the decedent’s incapacitation.
- The Pennsylvania Superior Court held § 1303.513(d) allows survival/wrongful‑death actions to be brought within two years after death; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding § 1303.513(d) is a statute of limitations that makes accrual run from death.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a medical‑malpractice survival action accrues at decedent’s injury or at death | Dubose: MCARE §1303.513(d) sets a two‑year limitations period running from death for survival/wrongful‑death claims | Appellants: Survival actions continue decedent’s pre‑death cause of action; accrual occurs when decedent knew/should have known of injury, so limitations ran earlier | Held: §1303.513(d) is a limitations provision for MCARE death cases and accrual runs from decedent’s death (two years) |
| Whether §1303.513(d) is a statute of repose (not tolled) or a statute of limitations (subject to tolling for fraud/ concealment) | Dubose: The text and presence of tolling language (fraudulent concealment) indicate a statute of limitations measured from death | Appellants: The section is titled “Statute of repose” and should not revive already‑barred claims or alter accrual rules | Held: Court treats subsection (a) as a seven‑year statute of repose but treats (d) as a limitations rule that controls timing for MCARE death cases and allows tolling language to apply |
| Whether general personal‑injury accrual rules (Pastierik/Anthony) control over MCARE §513(d) | Dubose: MCARE is a specific statute that supersedes general §5524(2) accrual rules for medical death cases | Appellants: Pre‑MCARE precedent showing survival actions are continuations of decedent’s claims should govern; §513(d) should not create longer filing windows | Held: Specific MCARE provision §1303.513(d) governs and displaces the general statute of limitations timing for MCARE death/survival claims |
| Whether amendments adding factual allegations after limitations expired prejudiced defendants | Appellants: Later amendments added new alleged bases of liability after the limitations window, prejudicing them | Dubose: No new causes added; amendments clarified earlier broadly pled injuries; trial‑court order required specificity | Held: Supreme Court did not decide this issue (outside scope of grant); Superior Court deemed it waived below |
Key Cases Cited
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (U.S. 2014) (distinguishes statutes of limitations from statutes of repose; repose measured from defendant’s last act and generally not tolled)
- Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1987) (survival action is continuation of decedent’s cause of action; accrual no later than death under discovery rule jurisprudence)
- Anthony v. Koppers Co., 436 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981) (discusses accrual for survival actions and discovery rule limits)
- Pezzulli v. D’Ambrosia, 26 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1942) (early recognition that survival statute does not create a new cause of action)
- Matharu v. Muir, 86 A.3d 250 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Superior Court held §1303.513(d) operates as a two‑year limitations period from death for survival claims)
- Baumgart v. Keene Bldg. Prods. Corp., 633 A.2d 1189 (Pa. Super. 1993) (discusses that survival actions are continuations of pre‑death claims and limitations run from accrual)