Duane Eugene Owen v. Florida Department of Corrections
686 F.3d 1181
11th Cir.2012Background
- Owen, a Florida death-row inmate, is convicted of Slattery's 1984 murder and separately sentenced to death for Worden's 1984 murder.
- Police questioned Owen about both murders over six videotaped sessions, and he confessed to both on June 21, 1984, after Miranda warnings were given.
- The Florida Supreme Court in Owen I (1990) held Owen’s Slattery confession was voluntary but inadmissible under Miranda due to continued questioning after equivocal rights invocations.
- After the Davis v. United States (1994) decision, Owen III (1995) held Davis applied to equivocal or ambiguous rights, leading to remand for new proceedings and further suppression considerations.
- At retrial (1999), Owen was convicted in the Slattery guilt phase and sentenced to death; DNA evidence linked semen to Owen; insanity defense was presented.
- Owen V (2008) and subsequent rulings upheld postconviction denials; Owen challenged the Miranda issues and jury-selection and appellate-counsel claims in federal habeas, which the district court denied with COA on three issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Miranda invocation whether statements were unequivocal | Owen asserted ‘I’d rather not talk about it’ and ‘I don’t want to talk about it’ were unequivocal invocations. | Owen argued Florida courts misapplied Davis and that the statements terminated interrogation. | Not unequivocal; interrogation permissible under Davis. |
| Voluntariness of confession | Confession was involuntary due to coercive interrogation. | State courts erred by finding voluntariness. | Confession voluntary; no AEDPA error. |
| Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in jury selection | Counsel should have struck jurors Knowles, Matousek, Griffin for bias. | No actual bias shown; strikes were reasonable in light of jurors' responses. | No reasonable probability of different outcome; not eligible for relief. |
| Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel re cross-examination of Dr. Berlin | Appellate counsel should have argued improper cross-examination about death-penalty views. | Cross-examination was harmless and did not prejudice the defense. | Florida Supreme Court's denial not unreasonable; no relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (ambiguity requires clarifying questions; unambiguous request needed to stop interrogation)
- Owen IV, Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2003) (Florida affirms equivocality of responses in Owen's case)
- Owen III, Owen v. State, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997) (law-of-the-case and Davis rationale; reconsideration after intervening decision)
- Thompkins, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (necessity of unambiguous invocation for right to counsel and silence)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard for reasonable jurists could disagree)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (clear error and reasonable application under AEDPA standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong deficient-performance and prejudice standard)
- Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (AEDPA review; reasonable disagreement standard)