Drury v. Village of Barrington Hills
123 N.E.3d 31
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Barrington Hills amended its zoning code in 2006 to allow residential horse boarding as a tightly limited "home occupation." Oakwood Farms (LeCompte) was later cited for operating a large commercial boarding operation in violation of that ordinance.
- LeCompte litigated the citation through administrative and state-court appeals; while litigation proceeded, the Village delayed enforcement. Drury (neighbor) sued LeCompte to enjoin the operation.
- In 2015 the Village Board adopted Ordinance 14-19 (over the president's veto), which redefined "agriculture" to permit large-scale horse boarding as of right and made that change retroactive to 2006—effectively validating LeCompte’s past violations.
- Plaintiffs (including Drury) sued, alleging Ordinance 14-19 was facially unconstitutional under substantive due process because it was passed solely to benefit LeCompte and lacked a rational relation to public health, safety, or welfare.
- The Board changed after the 2015 election, repealed Ordinance 14-19 in 2016, and the Village attempted an agreed settlement with Drury declaring the ordinance void ab initio; intervenors objected and the trial court refused to enter the agreed order, then dismissed Drury’s complaint on a 2-615 motion.
- On appeal the court affirmed rejection of the agreed settlement but reversed the dismissal of Drury’s substantive due process (facial) challenge and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court should have entered the parties' agreed settlement declaring Ordinance 14-19 void ab initio | Drury: Village may settle and ask court to enter agreed judgment declaring ordinance void ab initio | Intervenors: Village cannot unilaterally concede the ordinance unconstitutional and cannot bind intervenors who oppose settlement | Court: Affirmed trial court — Village cannot declare a statute facially unconstitutional and cannot settle the jointly defended claim over intervenors' objection |
| Whether Drury pleaded a viable facial substantive due process claim that Ordinance 14-19 bore no rational relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare | Drury: Ordinance was adopted solely to benefit LeCompte (retroactivity, timing, procedural irregularities); thus no rational basis and is void ab initio | Intervenors: Ordinance rationally aimed to clarify 2006 ordinance; challenged pleadings are conclusory and are a facial attack that must fail | Court: Reversed dismissal — taking pleaded facts as true, allegations (retroactivity, timing, departures from procedure, Village's own admissions) state a plausible facial claim meriting development in discovery/trial |
| Whether the appeal is moot because Ordinance 14-19 was repealed | Barrington Hills Farm: repeal renders the dispute moot | Drury: Facial relief (void ab initio) is meaningful because LeCompte asserts vested rights under the ordinance; repeal doesn’t negate retroactive invalidation | Court: Not moot — facial invalidation could prevent LeCompte from asserting vesting and provides effectual relief |
| Standard of review for 2-615 dismissal and whether dismissal was proper | Drury: Complaint sufficient; trial court erred | Intervenors: Pleadings inadequate under Napleton and rational-basis review | Court: Review de novo; dismissal improper as to substantive due process claim — factual allegations are sufficient to survive 2-615 |
Key Cases Cited
- Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296 (Illinois Supreme Court) (articulates rational-basis/substantial-relation test for zoning challenges)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (U.S. Supreme Court) (land-use/zoning judicial deference and substantial relation standard)
- Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91 (Illinois Supreme Court) (invalidating rezoning enacted to confer special benefits on a few rather than serve public welfare)
- Cosmopolitan Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 578 (Illinois Supreme Court) (invalidating rezoning because action served private interests and city failed to follow procedures)
- Phipps v. City of Chicago, 339 Ill. 315 (Illinois Supreme Court) (zoning amendment invalid where adopted for private desires without public need)
- Kennedy v. City of Evanston, 348 Ill. 426 (Illinois Supreme Court) (rezoning must be necessary for the public good; majority support alone insufficient)
- In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939 (Illinois Supreme Court) (facial invalidation renders statute void ab initio)
- Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (U.S. Supreme Court) (broad conception of public welfare and judicial restraint in legislative zoning choices)