Drury v. Ryan, G063080

Plaintiff Trisha Drury and Defendant Kathy Ryan were involved in a car collision when Ryan turned left across three oncoming lanes of traffic into a parking lot; the accident occurred when Drury, in the third lane, did not yield and struck Ryan's vehicle.
The first two lanes of opposing traffic had stopped and gestured for Ryan to turn, but she did not stop again to check the third lane before crossing.
Drury sued Ryan for negligence, arguing Ryan violated California Vehicle Code § 21801, which required yielding to all oncoming traffic that constitutes a hazard.
At trial, Drury requested but was denied a negligence per se jury instruction (CACI No. 418), which would have established a presumption of negligence if Ryan violated the statute.
The jury found for Ryan, concluding she was not negligent, and Drury appealed, challenging the refusal of the negligence per se instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Negligence per se instruction	Drury argued it was error to deny a negligence per se instruction where sufficient evidence showed Ryan violated § 21801 by not yielding to all hazard-constituting lanes.	Ryan argued the reasonable person and § 21801 instructions sufficed; no need for negligence per se instruction.	The trial court erred by not giving the negligence per se instruction; evidence supported it and its absence was prejudicial.
Statutory standard vs. Reasonableness	Statute (21801) sets specific standard for left turns; violation presumes negligence.	21801 incorporates general reasonableness; statutory and reasonableness instructions covered the standards needed.	Where a statute sets a specific standard and there's evidence of violation, negligence per se must be considered.
Prejudice from instructional error	The exclusion of the negligence per se instruction likely misled the jury on the applicable law, affecting the outcome.	Ryan argued that even if there was error, it was not prejudicial and did not affect the jury’s decision.	The error was prejudicial because it likely affected the verdict; reversal and remand required.
Applicability of prior case law	Relied on similar facts and rulings from prior appellate decisions (Sesler, Kirk) requiring tailored instruction.	Did not adequately address or distinguish those precedents.	Precedents confirmed the necessity for a tailored negligence per se instruction on these facts.

Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548 (Cal. 1994) (sets standard for instructional error in civil cases, requiring prejudice to reverse)
People v. Manriquez, 37 Cal.4th 547 (Cal. 2005) (de novo review applies when assessing instructional error)
Sesler v. Ghumman, 219 Cal.App.3d 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (instructional error to refuse clarification of duty to check all lanes before turning)
Norman v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 107 Cal.App.4th 1233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (standard for when negligence per se applies in civil trials)
LeMons v. Regents of University of California, 21 Cal.3d 869 (Cal. 1978) (articulates factors for assessing prejudice from erroneous jury instructions)