Drumgold v. Callahan
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2301
1st Cir.2013Background
- In 1988, twelve-year-old Darlene Moore was killed by a stray bullet in Boston, resulting in Shawn Drumgold’s 1989 Massachusetts first‑degree murder conviction.
- In 2003 Drumgold obtained a new trial motion based on allegedly withheld exculpatory evidence by Boston police, including Detective Callahan; the state granted relief and he was released.
- In 2003–2009 Drumgold pursued a federal §1983 action alleging due process violations for Brady evidence suppression and related misconduct by Callahan and others.
- At the 2008 civil trial the jury found Callahan did not withhold housing evidence or manufacture Evans’s statements, but the jury hung on causation regarding the money payments; a retrial was ordered.
- The 2009 retrial found Callahan liable for withholding both housing and money evidence, awarded Drumgold $14 million in damages, and raised questions about the scope of retrial and causation instructions.
- This appeal challenges materiality, qualified immunity, retrial scope, and the causation instructions, culminating in a reversal and remand for a new trial on proper grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether withheld evidence was material under Brady. | Drumgold argues materiality shown by likelihood of different trial result. | Callahan contends evidence was not material to Drumgold’s conviction. | Materiality found; not granted as to Callahan on this basis. |
| Whether Callahan is entitled to qualified immunity. | Brady/Mooney lines of cases support liability. | Law not clearly established in 1989 that Callahan had Brady-like disclosure duty. | Not entitled to qualified immunity; remand for new trial on causation instruction issue. |
| Whether the 2009 retrial’s causation instruction misstated the standard. | Causation should mirror Brady’s but-for standard. | Concurrent causation concept appropriate. | Instruction wrongly conflated but-for with substantial-factor; requires new trial. |
| Whether the retrial scope was proper amid prior findings on housing and money. | Remaining issues interwoven; comprehensive retrial warranted. | Partial retrial feasible. | District court did not abuse discretion in scope; remand for new trial on proper issues. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (materiality and reasonable probability standard)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999) (expands Brady to evidence known to law enforcement)
- Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (materiality and impeachment evidence standard)
- Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1935) (deliberate use of false testimony; foundation for Mooney line)
- Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1942) (early standard for deliberate suppression claims)
- Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (distinguishes Brady against police-disclosure duty)
- Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2004) (limits of Mooney/Brady lines in police‑conduct cases)
- Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (U.S. 1931) (partial retrial under Seventh Amendment)
- Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 873 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1989) (new-trial standards under erroneous instructions)