275 A.3d 257
Del.2022Background
- Plaintiff Shelley Droz sued Hennessy Industries after her husband, Eric Droz, was diagnosed with mesothelioma; he had used a Hennessy (AAMCO predecessor) arc grinder to resurface brake drum shoes while working at Larry’s Auto Repair from 1971–73 and later died during the litigation.
- Grinding asbestos-containing brake drum shoes releases asbestos dust; the arc grinder had a dust-collection bag that did not capture all dust and was described by Hennessy as a health hazard.
- Mr. Droz identified three brake manufacturers he worked with—Bendix, Wagner, and Raybestos—all of which sold asbestos-containing drum brake shoes in the early 1970s (Bendix and Wagner did not transition fully to asbestos-free drum shoes until the 1980s).
- Hennessy moved for summary judgment under the Superior Court’s Stigliano framework, arguing its arc grinder could be used with both asbestos-containing and asbestos-free brake shoes, which shifted the burden to Droz to show exposure to asbestos-containing shoes.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Hennessy, finding Droz did not link Mr. Droz to a specific asbestos-containing product; on appeal the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the summary judgment de novo and considered whether Droz had raised a genuine issue of material fact.
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held Stigliano’s burden-shifting approach was properly applied but found the summary judgment record contained sufficient circumstantial evidence (use of Wagner and Bendix products in 1971–73) to create a triable issue that Mr. Droz was exposed to asbestos dust while using Hennessy’s arc grinder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Proper application of Rule 56/Stigliano burden-shifting | Stigliano imposes an impermissibly heightened burden and should apply only to “coin-flip” identification situations | Stigliano correctly applies Rule 56: defendant must first show it made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions, then burden shifts to plaintiff | Stigliano is a proper Rule 56 framework; burden-shifting was correctly applied |
| 2. Nature of evidence required to defeat summary judgment | Circumstantial evidence (industry-wide prevalence; plaintiff’s testimony) suffices; plaintiff should not be required to show exclusive or direct proof | Plaintiff must provide direct or circumstantial evidence linking exposure to asbestos-containing product once burden shifts | Direct evidence not required; circumstantial evidence can defeat summary judgment |
| 3. Applicability of Stigliano where defendant’s product does not contain asbestos (arc grinder) | Stigliano should not apply because arc grinder is asbestos-free but can generate asbestos dust from other products | Stigliano applies where use of defendant’s product must be linked to asbestos-containing products that generated the dust | Stigliano applies; plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing product that generated dust while using defendant’s product |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence linking Mr. Droz to asbestos-containing brake shoes | Testimony that Mr. Droz used Bendix and Wagner, together with industry evidence that those makers sold asbestos-only drum shoes in early 1970s, creates triable issue | Hennessy: record lacks testimony linking Mr. Droz to a particular asbestos-containing brake shoe | Held for plaintiff: evidence about Wagner and Bendix was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Asbestos Litig. (Collins), 673 A.2d 159 (Del. 1996) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment and treatment of inference-drawing in asbestos cases)
- Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979) (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
- LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185 (Del. 2009) (crediting inferences in favor of non-moving party on summary judgment)
- Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069 (Wash. 2012) (Washington law: manufacturer liable where product use inevitably exposes users to asbestos)
- Woo v. Gen. Electric Co., 393 P.3d 869 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (Washington summary judgment principles requiring triable issue on inevitable exposure)