Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist, 301 Kan. 618

Background

Donald Drouhard presented to Harper Hospital ED with abdominal pain; CT scans were read verbally by radiologist Dr. Neil Rosenquist and a written report was later dictated but never sent to subsequent treating physicians.
A PA (Wedman) relayed Rosenquist’s verbal impression (suspected gallbladder obstruction); Drouhard was transferred to Via Christi where Via Christi clinicians and radiologists independently reviewed the CTs and documented different/normal findings.
Drouhard died the next day; coroner found an intrahepatic hematoma with acute intra-abdominal hemorrhage as cause of death.
Plaintiff (Drouhard’s daughter, successor) sued Rosenquist for malpractice alleging he failed to note abnormal gallbladder density, possible large hematoma, and contrast extravasation; plaintiff’s expert radiologist (Dr. Glick) opined Rosenquist breached the standard of care.
Rosenquist moved for summary judgment arguing plaintiff lacked evidence of causation in fact: (1) Via Christi physicians did not rely on Rosenquist’s read; and (2) plaintiff had no expert proof that, but for Rosenquist’s alleged misread, Drouhard would have survived.
The district court granted summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed summary judgment for Rosenquist because plaintiff failed to present sufficient causation evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment	Glick’s report/testimony shows that a correct read would have led to stat ultrasound/HIDA or emergency surgery and thus life-saving intervention	No expert link showing that different testing/treatment would have prevented death; Via Christi did not rely on Rosenquist’s read	Held for defendant: plaintiff failed to prove causation in fact; summary judgment affirmed
Whether expert testimony tied the defendant’s breach to a specific life-saving treatment and outcome	Glick’s opinions imply but do not specify which interventions or their effectiveness	Glick’s statements are speculative and do not identify or demonstrate efficacy of specific interventions	Held: expert opinion was insufficiently specific on causation and outcome
Whether absence of reliance by subsequent treating physicians precludes causation	Plaintiff argued reliance is not required; cites cases allowing testimony about what treating physicians would have done	Rosenquist argued and submitted uncontroverted facts showing Via Christi physicians independently reviewed CTs and did not rely on his report	Held: uncontroverted evidence that Via Christi did not rely on Rosenquist undermined plaintiff’s causation theory
Whether Florida cases (Munoz, Saunders) preclude summary judgment where treating physician testifies he would not have acted differently	Plaintiff relied on those cases to oppose summary judgment	Defendant distinguished them as factually inapposite; here plaintiff did not assert failure to inform treating physician was the negligent act	Held: Florida cases inapposite; summary judgment appropriate on facts here

Key Cases Cited

Puckett v. Mt. Carmel Regional Medical Center, 290 Kan. 406 (2010) (elements of medical malpractice and proximate cause framework)
Bank v. Parish, 298 Kan. 755 (2014) (summary judgment standard and viewing evidence in light most favorable to nonmovant)
U.S.D. No. 232 v. CWD Investments, 288 Kan. 536 (2009) (nonmoving party’s duty to come forward with facts to defeat summary judgment)
George v. Pauly, 30 Kan. App. 2d 444 (2001) (limitations on a physician’s role/qualification to characterize legal use of medical opinions)
Munoz v. South Miami Hospital, 764 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. App. 2000) (treating physician testimony about causation can preclude summary judgment in some circumstances)
Saunders v. Dickens, 151 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2014) (Florida Supreme Court approving Munoz principle regarding subsequent treating physician testimony)