1:21-cv-02866
D. Colo.Mar 10, 2025Background
- Michael Driscoll sued the City and County of Denver and multiple officers after being struck in the head by a projectile during the 2020 George Floyd protests in Denver.
- He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, First Amendment violations, and a Monell claim for failure to train or supervise against Denver and its officials.
- The court earlier dismissed claims against particular officers for statute of limitations and qualified immunity, and dismissed Driscoll’s failure-to-train claim for lack of factual support on allegations regarding officer training.
- After a jury in a related case (Epps) found Denver liable for failure to train during the same protests, Driscoll moved for reconsideration, arguing issue preclusion and manifest injustice if his claim was not revived.
- Denver moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, arguing Driscoll could not show a constitutional violation by a Denver officer or that a Denver policy caused his injuries.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reconsideration of failure to train dismissal | Epps case precludes Denver from relitigating failure-to-train; manifest injustice if not reconsidered | Epps is not controlling law/evidence; Driscoll's complaint remained deficient; no manifest injustice | Motion to reconsider denied; Epps does not change the analysis |
| Denver officer as cause of injury | Driscoll claims Denver SWAT shot him, supported by videos and police report | Driscoll cannot identify shooter; evidence only speculative, could have been mutual aid (Jeffco SWAT) | No genuine issue of material fact that Denver officer shot Driscoll |
| Denver policy as moving force for mutual aid actions | Denver’s policies and direction made mutual aid agencies their agents; policies caused the injuries | Mutual aid agencies used their own force policies; no evidence Denver policy caused injury | No evidence Denver policy was cause; summary judgment granted |
| Liability under Monell for actions of municipal ‘agents’ | Jeffco SWAT acted as agents of Denver due to command directives | Policy was to let mutual aid use their own protocols; no causal link established | No municipal liability; evidence insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom as moving force)
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (issue preclusion bars relitigation of ultimate facts)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard; genuine issue for trial)
- Park Lake Resources Ltd. Liability v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 378 F.3d 1132 (issue preclusion elements)
- Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (municipal liability and causation standards)
- Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dept., 717 F.3d 760 (causation required for § 1983 municipal liability)
- Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410 (municipal liability elements under Monell)
- Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784 (various ways to establish Monell liability)
