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496 P.3d 201
Utah
2021
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Background

  • LaMar and LaRene Drew (retirees) purchased life-insurance policies after relying on advice from R. Scott National, Inc. (RSN) that the policies could be resold on the secondary market; RSN also advised using a reverse mortgage to pay premiums. The resale profits never materialized and the policies lapsed.
  • Pacific Life had appointed RSN as an insurance producer (appointment notice Dec. 20, 2008; Producer’s Contract Jan. 5, 2009). The written contract authorized solicitation but contained express restrictions (e.g., no promises about policies, no solicitation of unsuitable products, compliance with law, no binding promises).
  • The Drews sued RSN and Pacific Life for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Pacific Life, finding RSN lacked actual and apparent authority.
  • The Utah Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding RSN was Pacific’s agent under Utah Code § 31A‑1‑301(88)(b) and that RSN’s conduct fell within the scope of authority (the court relied on scope-of-employment/respondeat superior principles).
  • The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari, held (1) RSN was Pacific’s "appointed licensee" under the Insurance Code (§ 31A‑23a‑115/405), (2) the court of appeals erred by defining agency under § 31A‑1‑301(88) and by importing respondeat superior tests into § 31A‑23a‑405(2), (3) RSN lacked actual (express or implied) authority because its conduct violated express contractual and legal prohibitions, but (4) RSN did have apparent authority (Pacific supplied policy forms; the Drews reasonably believed RSN represented Pacific), so the Drews were entitled to partial summary judgment on apparent authority and the presumption in § 31A‑23a‑405(2).

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether RSN was an "agent" of Pacific Life for purposes of insurer liability RSN was Pacific’s agent because it was a "producer for the insurer" (compensated by Pacific) and Pacific appointed RSN Pacific: agency is a common-law question; § 31A‑1‑301(88) is not the controlling test for insurer liability under § 31A‑23a‑405(2) Court: RSN was Pacific’s "appointed licensee" under § 31A‑23a‑115/405(2); court of appeals erred to hinge agency on § 31A‑1‑301(88)
Proper legal test for insurer liability under Utah Code § 31A‑23a‑405(2) Drews: statute should be read broadly to hold insurers accountable; court of appeals' scope approach appropriate Pacific: liability under § 405(2) depends on actual or apparent authority, not respondeat superior Court: § 405(2) expressly ties being "bound" to acts within actual (express or implied) or apparent authority; court of appeals erred by applying respondeat superior/scope-of-employment tests
Whether RSN had actual (express or implied) authority to make the challenged representations Drews: soliciting and describing Pacific’s products is within the Producer’s Contract, so actual authority exists Pacific: Producer’s Contract contains express prohibitions (no promises, no solicitation of unsuitable products, no acts contrary to law) that negate actual authority Court: RSN lacked actual express and implied authority as a matter of law because its conduct violated explicit contractual and legal limits
Whether RSN had apparent authority and whether Drews entitled to partial summary judgment Drews: Pacific’s supply of application forms and RSN’s conduct made a reasonable third-party belief that RSN represented Pacific, so apparent authority exists Pacific: Drews dealt only with RSN; mere use of Pacific forms is insufficient; no direct Pacific manifestations to Drews Court: Pacific’s provision of policy forms and the undisputed record (Drews saw forms and reasonably believed RSN represented Pacific) satisfy apparent-authority elements; Drews entitled to partial summary judgment on that ground

Key Cases Cited

  • Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1988) (discusses express and implied actual authority principles)
  • Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204 (Utah 1993) (sets three-element test for apparent authority)
  • Burdick v. Horner Townsend & Kent, Inc., 345 P.3d 531 (Utah 2015) (explains apparent vs actual authority; reliance and reasonableness standards)
  • M.J. v. Wisan, 371 P.3d 21 (Utah 2016) (discusses respondeat superior/scope-of-employment factors)
  • Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009 (Utah 2002) (employer vicarious liability discussion)
  • Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (Supreme Court discussion of scope-of-employment and vicarious liability)
  • Bodell Constr. Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 945 P.2d 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (cases distinguishing indicia-of-authority fact patterns)
  • Drew v. Pacific Life Ins. Co., 447 P.3d 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (court of appeals opinion reversed in part for misapplying agency tests)
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Case Details

Case Name: Drew v. Pacific Life Insurance Company
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 2, 2021
Citations: 496 P.3d 201; 2021 UT 55; Case No. 20190695
Docket Number: Case No. 20190695
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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    Drew v. Pacific Life Insurance Company, 496 P.3d 201